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Introductory note 
1. The introductory note in the fourth report on 
jurisdictional immunities of States and their property 
may still serve as a useful introduction to the present 
report, which is the fifth in the series of reports I 
prepared by the Special Rapporteur on the topic and 
submitted to the International Law Commission for 
consideration. 2 This fifth report is also foreshadowed 
by the general considerations of the scope of part III 
(art. 11), set out in the fourth report. 3 
previous reports have covered the first two parts, 
namely part I (Introduction) and part II (General prin-
ciples), as well as the initial articles of Part III (Excep-
tions to State immunity). 
A. Consideration of draft articles in progress 
2. It may be useful at this juncture to give a very brief 
account of the general structure of the draft articles, to 
indicate the extent of progress achieved so far and what 
is envisaged for the remainder of the study. The four 
I This series of reports was preceded by an exploratory report 
prepared in 1978 by the Working Group on the topic 
(A/CN.4/l.279/Rev.I), reproduced in part in Yearbook ... 1978, 
vol. II (Part Two), pp. 153-155. 
'The previous reports were: (a) preliminary report, Year-
book ... 1979, vol. II (Part One), p. 227, document A/CN.41 
323; (b) second report, Yearbook ... 1980, vol. II (Part One), 
p. 199, document A/CN.4/33 I and Add.l; (c) third report, 
Yearbook ... 1981, vol. II (Part One), p. 125, document A/CN.4/340 
and Add.l; (d) fourth report, Yearbook ... 1982, vol. II (Part One), 
p. 199, document A/CN.4/357. 
, Document A/CN.4/357 (see footnote 2 (d) above), paras. 10-28. 
1. PART I. INTRODUCTION 
3. Part I (Introduction) comprises five articles. Ar-
ticle 1 (Scope of the present articles) was revised and 
provisionally adopted by the Commission at its thirty-
fourth session.· Article 2 (Use of terms) has in part been 
discussed: a definition has been adopted for the term 
"court"; some terms have been withdrawn and others 
are yet to be discussed and revised.' Article 3 (Inter-
• Article I as revised reads as follows: 
"Article 1. Scope of the present articles 
"The present articles apply to the immunity of one State and its 
property from the jurisdiction of the courts of another State." 
See Yearbook ... 1982, vol. II (Part Two), p. 99. 
, For the original text of article 2, ibid., p. 95, footnote 224. The 
definition adopted (para. I (a» is as follows: 
"\. For the purposes of the present articles: 
"(a) 'court' means any organ of a State, however named, en-
titled to exercise judicial functions;" (Ibid., p. 100.) 
The definitions of the terms "territorial State" (para. I (e» and 
"foreign State" (para. I (d» have been withdrawn. The term "trading 
or commercial activity" (para. I (j) is yet to be considered by the 
Drafting Committee, in connection with article 12. 
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pretative provisions) has been partly abandoned, while 
paragraph 2 remains to be discussed in con.nection with 
the criterion for determining the commercial character 
of trading or commercial activity as defined in article 2, 
para. 1 (f).6 Article 4 (Jurisdiction.al immunitie~ not 
within the scope of the present articles) and article 5 
(Non-retroactivity of the present articles)' have been 
presented to facilitate consideration of the draft articles 
and, as customary, will be discussed by the Commission 
after the remaining draft articles have been completed. 
Thus, of the five articles constituting part I,' only ar-
ticle 1 has been provisionally adopted, while the other 
provisions await further discussion and action by the 
Commission. 
2. PART II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
4. Part II (General principles) contains a series of five 
more articles, all of which have been fully discussed by 
the Commission. Draft article 6 (State immunity), pro-
visionally adopted by the Commission at its thirty-
second session,9 is currently under review in the 
Drafting Committee, which is expected to propose 
an improved version for reconsideration by the Com-
mission. 10 Articles 7, 8 and 9 were provisionally adopted 
by the Commission at its thirty-fourth session, while ar-
ticle 10, which for lack of time is still with the Drafting 
Committee, is not expected to present insuperable dif-
ficulties. II 
• For the text" of article 3, ibid., p. 96, footnote 225. Paragraph 
I (a), which deals in detail with what is meant by the expression 
"foreign State" for the purposes of the jurisdictional immunities of 
States, is to be examined later; paragraph I (b) is no longer required in 
view of the adoption of draft article 7, and the definition of the term 
"jurisdiction" has been replaced by that of the term "court" (see 
footnote 5 above). 
, For the texts of articles 4 and 5, see Yearbook ... 1982, vol. II 
(Part Two), p. 96, footnotes 226 and 227, respectively. 
• Articles I to 5 were first presented in the second report of the 
Special Rapporteur (see footnote 2 (b) above), which was considered 
by the Commission at its thirty-second session (Yearbook ... 1980, 
vol. II (Part Two), pp. 138 et seq., paras. 111-122) and by the Sixth 
Committee of the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session (see 
"Topical summary, prepared by the Secretariat, of the discussion in 
the Sixth Committee on the report of the Commission during the 
thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly" (A/CN.4/L.326), 
paras. 311-326~. 
, Article 6 as provisionally adopted by the Commission at its thirty-
second session reads as follows: 
"Article 6. State immunity 
"I. A State is immune from the jurisdiction of another State in 
accordance with the provisions of the present articles. 
"2. Effect shall be given to State immunity in accordance with 
the provisions of the present articles." 
See Yearbook '" /982, vol. II (Part Two), p. HIO, footnote 239. 
II Several revisions have been proposed, such as: 
"A State is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of another 
State except as provided in the present articles"; or " ... except as 
provided in articles ... and ... "; or " ... to the extent and subject 
to the limitations provided in the present articles". 
" Articles 7 to 10 were considered by the Commission at its thirty-
third and thirty-fourth sessions: see Yearbook ... 1981, vol. II (Part 
Two), pp. 154 et seq., paras. 208-227; and Yearbook '" 1982, vol. II 
(Part Two), pp. 97-98, paras. 185-192. See also the observations made 
by the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly in "Topical sum-
mary, prepared by the Secretariat, of the discussion in the Sixth Com-
",Iittee on the report of the Commission during the thirty-seventh ses-
sIon of the General Assembly" (A/CN.4/L.352), paras. 171-178. 
S. Article 6 attempts to state the general principle of 
State immunity as a sovereign right from the point of 
view of a State claiming immunity from the jurisdiction 
of the courts of another State. On the other hand, 
article 7, now entitled "Modalities for giving effect 
to State immunity" ,12 endeavours to restate, in 
paragraph I, the corresponding obligation on the part 
of the other State to accord immunity or give effect to 
State immunity by refraining from exercising the jur-
isdiction of its otherwise competent judicial authority 
in a given case involving a foreign State. Paragraph 2 
identifies what may be considered to be proceedings 
against another State, even when it is not named as a 
party, while paragraph 3 gives a general classification of 
what constitutes a State for the purposes of jurisdic-
tional immunities, namely an organ of the State, an 
agency or instrumentality of the State in respect of "an 
act performed in the exercise of governmental auth-
ority", or "one of the representatives of that State in 
respect of an act performed in his capacity as a represen-
tative". A State is also impleaded when the proceeding 
is designed to deprive that State of its property or of the 
use of property in its possession or control. Article 7 is, 
indeed, a central provision of part II of the draft ar-
ticles. Together with article 6, which is to be revised, it 
contains the main general principles of State im-
munity.l! 
6. Article 8 (Express consent to the exercise of 
jurisdiction)l. constitutes an important qualification by 
stipulating that absence of consent is a prerequisite for a 
successful claim of State immunity. It also spells out the 
various ways in which consent may be expressly given." 
" "Article 7. Modalities for giving effect to State immunity 
"I. A State shall give effect to State immunity (under article 6) 
by refraining from exercising jurisdiction in a proceeding before its 
courts against another State. 
"2. A proceeding before a court of a State shall be considered 
to have been instituted against another State, whether or not that 
other State is named as a party to that proceeding, so long as the 
proceeding in effect seeks to compel that other State either to sub-
mit to the jurisdiction of the court or to bear the consequences of a 
determination by the court which may affect the rights, interests, 
properties or activities of that other State. 
"3. In particular, a proceeding before a court of a State shall be 
considered to have been instituted against another State when the 
proceeding is instituted against one of the organs of that State. or 
against one of its agencies or instrumentalities in respect of an act 
performed in the exercise of governmental authority, or against one 
of the representatives of that State in respect of an act performed in 
his capacity as a representative, or when the proceeding is designed 
to deprive that other State of its property or of the use of property 
in its possession or control." (Yearbook ... 1982. vol. II (Part 
Two), p. 100.) 
" See the commentary to article 7. ibid .• pp. 100 et seq. 
,. "Article 8. Express consent to the exercise of jurisdiction 
"A State cannot invoke immunity from jurisdiction in a pro-
ceeding before a court of another State with regard to any matter if 
it has expressly consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by that 
court with regard to such a matter: 
"(a) by international agreement; 
"(b) in a written contract; or 
"(c) by a declaration before the court in a specific case." (Ibid .• 
p. 107.) 
" See the commentary to article 8, ibid., pp. 107 et seq. 
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7. Article 9 (Effect of participation in a proceeding 
before a court)" specifies the conditions for giving con-
sent by conduct and defines the extent to which a State 
is considered to have consented by participating in a 
proceeding before a court, and, by so limiting the scope 
of its effect, also serves to indicate the circumstances in 
which a State can intervene or take a step in a pro-
ceeding without being considered to have consented to 
the exercise of jurisdiction by that court. 17 
8. Article 10 (Counter-claims), as revised by the 
Special Rapporteur, II is still under consideration by the 
Drafting Committee. It deals with the extent of the ef-
fect of counter-claims against a State which has itself in-
stituted a legal proceeding in a court of another State, as 
well as counter-claims by a State." 
3. PART III. EXCEPTIONS TO STATE IMMUNITY 
9. Articles 11 (Scope of the present part) and 12 
(Trading or commercial activity), presented by the 
Special Rapporteur in his fourth report,20 were the sub-
ject of extensive preliminary discussion during the 
thirty-fourth session of the Commission. The drafts of 
these articles in their original form, as well as the revised 
versions21 prepared in the light of the discussion in the 
" "Article 9. Effect of participation in a 
proceeding before a court 
"I. A State cannot invoke immunity from jurisdiction in a pro-
ceeding before a court of another State if it has: 
"(a) itself instituted that proceeding; or 
"(b) intervened in that proceeding or taken any other step 
relating to the merits thereof. 
"2. Paragraph I (b) above does not apply to any intervention or 
step taken for the sole purpose of: 
"(a) invoking immunity; or 
"(b) asserting a right or interest in property at issue in the pro· 
ceeding. 
"3. Failure on the part of a State to enter an appearance in a 
proceeding before a court of another State shall not be considered 
as consent of that State to the exercise of jurisdiction by that 
court." (Ibid., p. 109.) 
" See the commentary to article 9, ibid., pp. 109 et seq. 
II "Article 10. Counter-claims 
"I. In any legal proceedings instituted by a State, or in which a 
State has taken part or a step relating to the merit, in a court of 
another State, jurisdiction may be exercised in respect of any 
counter-claim arising out of the same legal relationship or facts as 
the principal claim, or if, in accordance with the provisions of the 
present articles, jurisdiction could be exercised, had separate pro-
ceedings been instituted before that court. 
"2. A State making a counter-claim in proceedings before a 
court of another State is deemed to have given consent to the exer-
cise of jurisdiction by that court with respect not only to the 
counter-claim but also to the principal claim, arising out of the 
same legal relationship or facts [as the counter-claim)." (Ibid., 
p. 95, footnote 218.) 
It Certain doubts were expressed in the general discussion in the 
Commission at its thirty-fourth session as to the usefulness of 
paragraph 2. On balance, it appears to have an independent purpose. 
It is useful to know precisely the extent to which a State making a 
counter-claim may be said to have consented to the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the court in respect of the principal claim and none 
other. 
.. For the texts of articles II and 12 as originally presented by the 
Special Rapporteur, ibid., p. 95, footnotes 220 and 221, respectively. 
.. The revised texts of articles II and 12 were presented to the Draf· 
ting Committee as document A/CN.4/L.351 (see footnotes 23 and 24 
below). 
Commission,22 are still with the Drafting Committee. 
The Commission has resolved to appoint and convene 
the next Drafting Committee at the beginning of the 
forthcoming session, so as to allow it to complete its 
work on the draft articles referred to its predecessor 
and to itself. 
10. Article 11 (Scope of the present part), in its revised 
form,H may still have a useful role to playas a link be-
tween part II (General principles) and part III (Excep-
tions to State immunity) and as warning sign announc-
ing the approach to a "grey zone". 
11. Article 12 (Trading or commercial activity), both 
in its original version and as slightly revised by the 
Special Rapporteur, 24 represents the first entry into a 
"controversial area". The Commission has had an in-
teresting round of discussion on this subject and the 
draft will be examined by the Drafting Committee 
in 1983. 
B. Debate in the Sixth Committee 
of the General Assembly 
12. As the thirty-seventh session of the General 
Assembly, the debate of the Sixth Committee on the 
substance of the topic of jurisdictional immunities of 
States and their property was particularly rich. More 
than 40 representatives spoke on one aspect or another 
of State immunity and commented on the draft articles 
provisionally adopted by the Commission on those still 
under consideration by the Drafting Committee and on 
the methods of approach.2! The Special Rapporteur has 
been encouraged by the constructive observations from 
representatives of Member States and ventures to think 
that it would be useful to clarify some of the points 
raised so as to make them crystal clear, beyond any 
reasonable shadow of doubt, especially regarding the 
methods, objectives and structure of the work under-
taken on the topic and to be progressively continued. 
1. THE INDUCTIVE METHOD 
13. Despite certain criticism from outside the Com-
mission and the Sixth Committee of the seeming indif-
ference and relatively inactive role of developing nations 
" Yearbook ... 1982, vol. II (Part Two). pp. 98-99, paras. 193-197. 
" "Article 1 J. Scope of the present part 
"The application of the exceptions provided in part III of the 
present articles may be subject to a condition of reciprocity or any 
other condition as mutually agreed between the States concerned." 
(Ibid., p. 99, footnote 237.) 
" "Article 12. Trading or commercial activity 
"I. Unless otherwise agreed, a State is not immune from the 
jurisdiction of the courts of another State in respect of proceedings 
relating to any trading or commercial activity conducted, partly or 
wholly, in the territory of that otlier State, by the State itself or by 
one of its organs or agencies whether or not organized as a separate 
legal entity. 
"2. Paragraph I does not apply to transactions or contracts 
concluded between States or on a government-to-government 
basis." (Ibid.) 
" See "Topical summary ..... (A/CN.4/L.352), paras. 157-185. 
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in the process of international law-making,26 it is 
reassuring to hear comments in the Sixth Committee 
highlighting the practical importance of the topic and its 
extreme complexities, notwithstanding its assignment 
for the first time to an Asian Special Rapporteur from a 
developing country of very great antiquity. It is also 
most reassuring to this Special Rapporteur to hear con-
firmation of his finding, through the inductive method 
as proposed by Mr. Tsuruoka 27-another Asian jurist of 
profound traditional legal background-that State im-
munity is based on fundamental principles of interna-
tional law, among which have been mentioned, un-
challenged, the sovereignty and sovereign equality of 
States. The inductive method has not been the primary 
approach used in the study of all topics but is highly 
recommended for the present topic and has become the 
selected and respected method. 21 
14. According to this inductive method, as the Special 
Rapporteur has pointed out time and again, no deus ex 
machina is used. Rather, reference is made in the study 
to the existing practice of all States, large and small, rich 
and poor, developing or industrially more advanced, 
before reaching any conclusion. The search is concen-
trated first and foremost on judicial practice, or judicial 
decisions, but not necessarily confined to them. It 
covers also national legislations as evidence of State 
practice and opinions of writers on the practice as wen 
as the principles. It does not omit or overlook the views 
of Governments on all relevant questions. The treaty 
practice of an States has also been examined, as well as 
bilateral treaties and multilateral or regional conven-
tions. 
15. Indeed, the search for basic materials has been 
very thorough and, from the start of its study of the 
topic, the Commission decided, on the recommendation 
of the Special Rapporteur, to ask an Member States to 
lend their support by communicating information, 
materials concerning judicial decisions, case-law, na-
tional legislation and opinions of Governments, as wen 
as replies to the questionnaire prepared by the 
Secretariat in co-operation with the Special 
Rapporteur. 29 Neither he nor those States which have 
not provided information concerning judicial and 
government practice can be justly accused of omission 
or neglect, since practice is to evolve and cannot be 
fabricated. Nevertheless, neither the Special Rap-
porteur, nor the Commission, nor the Sixth Committee 
can belittle the significance of existing practice as is 
prevalent the world over and which remains unopposed 
" See UNIT AR, The International Law Commission. The Need 
for a New Direction (United Nations publication, Sales 
No. E.8J.XV.PE/I), especially pp. 13-15. 
" See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Ses-
sion, Sixth Commillee, 48th meeting, para. 40. 
" See, on this question, the fourth report of the Special Rapporteur 
(see footnote 2 (d) above), para. 10. 
" The materials submitted by Governments, as well as their replies 
to the questionnaire, appear in the volume of the United Nations 
Legislative Series entitled Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities of 
States and their Property (Sales No. E/F.8J.V.IO). 
~y other silent States in the absence of opposing prac-
tIce. 
2. CONTRADICTIONS AND DIVERGENCES 
IN STATE PRACTICE 
16. On the other hand, it should also be observed that 
in the study of the present topic, resort to the inductiv~ 
method has proved most disconcerting. To begin with, 
not all States have developed or even started to develop 
a judicial practice on this or indeed on any topic of 
public or private international law . Within the Commis-
sion, the question has been raised whether it could be 
said that the principle of State immunity was ever truly 
established in State practice, when the Commission has 
had before it the judicial practice of only a handful of 
States. The Special Rapporteur was at pains to explain 
that all the available evidence of existing State practice 
on State immunity had been presented to the Commis-
sion. It was not at random or by a selective method that 
the practice of only 25 countries had been used in the 
preparation of earlier reports and that not all examples 
had been individually presented for examination and 
comments in the study of each and every aspect of State 
immunity, to which some were in any event not really 
pertinent. 
17. It is not unnatural that contradictions and 
divergences abound in the judicial practice of the 
various nations examined, and indeed in the practice of 
the same legal system or even of the same court of law 
over the same period of time. If the Special Rapporteur 
had been shy to expose such inconsistencies, he would 
have been guilty of further distorting the already much 
distorted practice of States. It is distorted in that its 
development has followed a somewhat zigzagging and 
tortuous path, almost like the mighty Asian river, the 
Mekong, which has its source in the highest mountains 
in the world, the Himalayas, and whose water is derived 
from unrecorded rainfall and melting snow, flowing 
from endless tributaries through the rapids of Tibet and 
converging into the Mekong's main stream between 
Burma, Laos and Thailand, rushing through Kam-
puchea with added momentum from the Great Lake, 
forming countless islands and precipices, disfiguring 
landscapes and finally diverging into a gushing delta 
before plunging into the absorbing Gulf of Thailand. 
3. EMERGENCE OF CONVERGING PRINCIPLES 
AND PRACTICE 
18. A bird's-eye view of the tortuous path taken by 
legal developments, comparable to that of the Mekong 
River, is bound to give a picture that appears twisted 
and distorted, with the exception of some relatively 
straighter stretches. Just as it does not appear humanly 
possible to straighten the course of the Mekong, so it 
seems impossible to unbend every twist and turn in the 
path of development of the law. As the Thames flows 
through many bends and brooks before reaching its 
estuary and the North Sea, so British practice concern-
ing trading or commercial activity of State-owned or 
State-operated vessels cannot be said to have finally 
30 Documents of the thirty-fifth session 
been settled until the long overdue decision of the House 
of Lords in the "I Congreso del Partido" case (1981),30 
and not without legislative initiatives and judicial hesita-
tions. A study of the judicial practice of States does not 
lend itself to a facile restatement of ready-made law of 
any country. On the contrary, it shows an intensified 
process of judicial reasoning which is dialectic and em-
pirical rather than dogmatic or dictatorial. 
19. The Sixth Committee concurred with the finding 
of the Commission that the general principle of State 
immunity was established in the practice of States. It 
should be added that, when State immunity was con-
sidered to have been firmly established, the world was 
not so divided into socialist and non-socialist, or 
developing and industrially advanced countries. Indeed, 
when the principles of an international law of State im-
munity were widely accepted, there were no socialist 
States, nor so-called advanced countries. The first pro-
nouncement of the law was by the highest authority of 
the world's youngest nation at the time, the United 
States of America, in The Schooner "Exchange" 
v. McFaddon and others (l812),l! and -it was from the 
start based on existing customary intemationallaw~- not 
on United States law, nor on American law. Indeed, the~ 
United States was only an infant nation compared with 
aged Thailand and old Japan; it was like a child just 
starting to talk and walk, having just won its national 
independence. The process of decolonization took more 
than a few decades. It was during the height of the 
Napoleonic Wars (1812), with Europe torn by serious 
conflicts in the north, the east and the south, that State 
immunity was recognized. The law on the subject came 
to be settled in that young, revolutionary and thriving 
nation even before it had to undergo a national convul-
sion, the unsettling experience of the Civil War. 
20. International law on State immunity was estab-
lished in Belgium 32 and Italy33-equally young and 
newly independent States of Europe-in a very restric-
tive sense. Egyptian practiceH followed suit. Although 
.. The All England Law Reports, 1981, vol. 2, p. 1064; see the judg-
ment pronounced by Lord Wilberforce (pp. 1066-1078), as well as the 
concurring opinion of Lord Edmund-Davies in favour of dismissing 
the appeal in the "Marble Islands" case (pp. 1080-1082), and the 
dissenting opinions of Lord Diplock (pp. 1078-1080) and of Lord 
Keith and Lord Bridge (pp. 1082-1083), in favour of allowing an ap-
peal in both cases. 
" W. Cranch, Reports 0/ Cases argued and adjudged in the 
Supreme Court 0/ the United States (New York, 1911), vol. VII (3rd 
ed.), p. 116. 
" See, for example, Etat du Perou v. Kreglinger (1857) (Pasicrisie 
beige, 1857 (Brussels), part 2, p. 348); see also the decision of the 
Court of Appeal of Brussels of 30 December 1840 (ibid., 1841, part 2, 
p. 33), and the cases cited in the fourth report of the Special Rap-
porteur (see footnote 2 (d) above), paras. 58-59 . 
.. See, for example, Morellel v. Governo Danese (1882) 
(Giurisprudenza Italiana (Turin), vol. XXXV, part I (1883), pp. 125 
and 130-131), and the cases cited in the fourth report of the Special 
Rapporteur (see footnote 2 (d) above), paras. 56-57. 
.. See, tor example, the S.S. "Sumatra" case (1920) (Bulletin de 
legislation et de jurisprudence egyptiennes (Alexandria), vol. 33 
(1920-1921), p. 25; Journal du droit international (Clunet) (Paris), 
vol. 48 (1921), p. 270), and the cases cited in the fourth report of the 
Special Rapporteur (see footnote 2 (d) above), paras. 60-61. 
its mixed courts were somewhat international, Egypt, 
itself an old nation, belongs to Africa and the Medi-
terranean rather than to central Europe. Practice did 
not start developing all at once in every country at the 
same time. 
21. The Commission and subsequently the Sixth Com-
mittee of the General Assembly were able to recognize 
the existence of a general principle of State immunity on 
the basis of an examination of the judicial practice of a 
few States in the nineteenth century, although of course 
the extent of State immunity was by no means uniform. 
The practice of major European Powers such as the 
United Kingdom,3S France36 and Germany3? was full of 
uncertainties and surprises. Nevertheless, out of this ut-
ter confusion it was possible to identify the emergence 
of a clear general rule of State immunity. 
4. ABSENCE OF PRACTICE IN SOME STATES 
22. Doubts have been raised as to the correctness of 
identifying as international law the customary law as 
developed through the practice of only 25 countries and 
applying it to the rest of the community of nations, as if 
the Commission had deIiberalely omItted to examine the 
practice of any State. The truth is the opposite. Each 
and every State has been consulted. The examination of 
State practice has been thorough and exhaustive. None 
was left out. There are no other decisions or outside ex-
perts to be consulted, no extraterrestrial beings to in-
form us of what the law is in such and such a country at 
such and such a time. The fact remains that, of the ex-
isting and available practice of States, the Commission 
has taken occasion to consider all, without fear or 
favour. 
23. The conclusion that is emerging is clear enough. 
State immunity was never considered to be an absolute 
principle in any sense of the term. At no time was it 
viewed as a jus cogens or an imperative norm. The rule 
was from the beginning subject to various qualifica-
tions, limitations and exceptions. This is recognized 
even in the recent legislation adopted in certain socialist 
countries.3I The differences of opinion seem to linger 
only in the areas where exceptions and limitations are 
put into application. That is why part III of the draft ar-
ticles, "Exceptions to State immunity", has already 
given rise to some controversies. But the argument 
should apply ajortiori, or at least with equal force, that 
the evolutionary process of the law does not require the 
positive or active participation of all States. While it 
cannot exclude any State from participation, absence of 
practice is no ground for liability for neglect or 
negligence on the part of States. However, such absence 
cannot be invoked to invalidate or otherwise downgrade 
.. See, for example, the cases cited in the fourth report of the 
Special Rapporteur (see footnote 2 (d) above), paras. 80-87. 
" Idem, paras. 62-66. 
" Idem, paras. 67-68 . 
.. See, for example, article 61 of the Fundamentals of Civil Pro-
cedure of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Union 
Republics, reproduced in United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictional 
Immunities ... , p. 40. 
L 
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the existing and prevailing practice of which abundant 
evidence is available elsewhere. If once it was admissible 
that there was a law of State immunity, it should be 
equally admissible to define and identify its contents 
and examine its application in controversial areas. That 
is precisely the purpose of part 1II. 
C. Advancement of work on preparation 
of the draft articles 
24. Encouraged by the substantial support voiced in 
the Sixth Committee for the existing structure of the 
draft articles, and bearing in mind the words of caution 
and wise advice pronounced by so many well-wishers, as 
well as the constructive proposals for drafting im-
provements which will be taken into consideration at or 
before the second reading of the draft articles, the 
Special Rapporteur is ready to proceed along the path 
that has been charted with the approval of the Commis-
sion and the endorsement of the Sixth Committee. 
Without prejudice to his future findings, the Special 
Rapporteur heartily and gratefully accepts the reminder 
that, in his approach to the "grey zone", the paramount 
interests of humanity must be recognized, and that con-
sideration should equally be given to safeguarding the 
vital interests of all States, including the socialist States, 
the developing States and the least developed countries, 
whatever their denomination, size, location or ideology, 
and of all nations of whatever social, political or 
economic structure. 
25. At this juncture, the Special Rapporteur begs to 
lodge a caveat in the same co-operative and constructive 
spirit: it is easy to say, in the absence of State practice in 
a given country or without reference thereto, that the 
law as developed in the practice of so wide a region as 
Asia, Africa or Latin America points in a definite direc-
tion, or is the opposite of the prevailing practice in 
Western Europe, or is in any way similar to the practice 
of socialist countries. Nothing could be further from the 
truth. Nothing could be nearly so dangerous as such a 
sweeping statement, which the Special Rapporteur, in 
all earnestness and good conscience, feels compelled to 
implore representatives of States to avoid. A glance at 
the judicial practice and national legislations of 
Pakistan, India, Singapore or Japan will reveal a strong 
trend away from any absolute doctrine. Neither 
Pakistan nor Singapore can be said not to be Asian, nor 
to be no longer thriving and developing nations. A brief 
examination of their legislation and practice will suffice 
to silence any sweeping statements about Asian practice 
being identified with that of socialist or capitalist coun-
tri.es. There is no such thing as practice which could be 
said to be the common law of Asia, Africa or Latin 
America, nor are the interests of developing nations 
identical or necessarily alike on every issue. Indeed, 
each area of controversy should be examined on its own 
merits. No predetermined dogma nor any amount of 
absolutism should be allowed to dictate or disturb 
any serious study of relevant progressive legal 
developments. The Special Rapporteur continues to 
benefit from the lessons to be learned from the inductive 
method and craves the indulgence of representatives of 
Governments to continue to be patient so that the pro-
cess of sedimentation and crystallization of the law may 
proceed unimpeded. 
26. As planned, therefore, the draft articles dealing 
with specified areas in which limitations or exceptions to 
State immunity may be recognized and applied will be as 
follows: 
Article 13 "Contracts of employment"; 
Article 14 "Personal injuries and damage to prop-
erty"; 
Article 15 "Ownership, possession and use of prop-
erty" ; 
Article 16 "Patents, trade marks and other intellec-
tual properties"; 
Article 17 "Fiscal liabilities and customs duties"; 
Article 18 "Shareholdings and membership of 
bodies corporate"; 
Article 19 "Ships employed in commercial ser-
vice"; 
Article 20 "Arbitration" . 
27. It is no accident that the specified areas of con-
troversy under examination in part III have been the 
subject of some regulation in a multilateral convention19 
and have partially received legislative ratification in 
some countries, both signatories and indeed non-
signatories to this Convention. Such an investigation 
does not imply endorsement or disapproval of the pro-
posals contained in the Convention or in any other 
bilateral agreements in particular, or as revised and 
modified by a number of national legislations.·o 
" See Council of Europe, European Convention on State Immunity 
and Additional Protocol (1972), European Treaty Series (Strasbourg), 
No. 74 (1972); reproduced in United Nations, Materials on Jurisdic-
tionallmmunities '" ,pp. 156 et seq. See also the International Con-
vention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to the Immunity 
of State-owned Vessels (Brussels, 1926) and Additional Protocol 
(Brussels, 1934) (League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. CLXXVI, 
pp. 199 and 215; reproduced in United Nations, Materials on Jurisdic-
tionallmmunities '" , pp. 173 et seq.). 
'G See, for example, the United States Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act of 1976 (see footnote 66 below), the United Kingdom 
State Immunity Act 1978 (see footnote 65 below), the Pakistan State 
Immunity Ordinance. 1981 (see footnote 69 below) and Singapore's 
State Immunity Act. 1979 (see footnote 68 below), 
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PART Ill. EXCEPTIONS TO STATE IMMUNITY (continued) 
ARTICLE 13 (Contracts or employment) 
A_ General considerations 
1. SCOPE OF "CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT" 
AS AN EXCEPTION TO STATE IMMUNITY 
28. The purpose of draft article 13 is to define the 
scope of the area specified as "contracts of employ-
ment" as a possible exception to the general principle of 
State immunity. Many questions are immediately rele-
vant to the general considerations in this specific area 
which concerns primarily "contracts of employment" 
between individuals and a State for the performance of 
services within the territory of another State. 
29. "Contracts of employment" between individuals 
and a corporation or an agency not attributable to a 
State, nor to an organ of a State, nor to one of its agen-
cies or instrumentalities acting in the exercise of the 
governmental authority of the State as stipulated in ar-
ticle 7, paragraph 3," of the present draft articles, will 
lie outside the scope of the current study. Only "con-
tracts of employment" concluded by or on behalf of a 
State as employer would come under the purview of ar-
ticle 13. The first element is therefore employment by a 
State, as the area of investigation is confined to the con-
tractual relationship between individuals and a State for 
the performance of services in the territory of another 
State. 
30. The second element appears to be the services to be 
rendered by the employees of that State within the ter-
ritory or the territorial jurisdiction of another State. 
The cause of action or the dispute in question would 
relate to the contractual relationship with the State as an 
employer before the courts of another State. 
31. The third element is the possibility or justiciability 
of proceedings brought before the courts of another 
State against the employer State by an employee seeking 
redress in respect of a breach of a term of the contract 
of employment, based on an existing contractual rela-
tionship binding on the State in respect of services 
rendered or performed in the territory of another State. 
The subject-matter of the dispute may be classified as 
labour relations or the terms and conditions of employ-
ment, covering compensation, social security, pensions, 
and so on. In other words, the gist of this specified area 
of exceptions to State immunity covers the actionability 
of obligations undertaken by, or binding on, a State and 
arising out of contracts of employment of individuals 
for the performance of services in another State. Ex-
cluded from the scope of this article are questions of 
vicarious responsibility or employer's liability in respect 
., See footnote 12 above. 
of acts performed by its employees, even in the territory 
of another State. Such liability may be relevant in a dif-
ferent context, but the present question is concerned ex-
clusively with proceedings based on the relationship be-
tween individual employees and an employer which is a 
foreign State or foreign Government from the point of 
view of the State of the forum. 
2. THE QUESTION OF JURISDICTION 
32. In an examination of the extent of State immunity 
in any specified area of activity, the question of jurisdic-
tion is not altogether irrelevant, since, in any event, it is 
the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign State that is at 
stake. State immunity, in the area of "contracts of 
employment" under examination, necessarily presup-
poses the existence of jurisdiction, the non-exercise of 
which is required by application of State immunity. For 
this reason, the scope of "contracts of employment" in 
the present study is confined to the employment by a 
State of individuals for a service to be rendered or per-
formed in the territory of another State, that is in the 
territory of the forum-in other words, within the 
jurisdiction of the courts of that other State. 
33. Jurisdiction is therefore presupposed in any ques-
tion of State immunity. The closest connection should 
exist with the court trying the dispute arising out of the 
contract of employment. This is translatable in terms of 
the territory where the service is performed under the 
contract of employment, namely within the territory of 
another State, and therefore within the jurisdiction of 
the courts of that other State. Without this intimate link 
to the territory of that other State, the question of State 
immunity could be confused with other questions or 
other grounds for non-justiciability of the dispute, for 
lack of jurisdiction, either because of the absence of a 
territorial connection or because of the nature of the 
subject-matter of the dispute, or for any other reason, 
such as the "act of State" doctrine. Since jurisdiction of 
a court is a matter of local or national law , it is not for 
this study to lay down a set of uniform rules regarding 
the qualifications for jurisdiction of a court of law or a 
labour court in a given country. Jurisdiction may, in 
any event. be initially presumed to exist once there is 
prima facie proof of sufficient territorial connection 
with the trial court through performance of the employ-
ment within the territory of the State of the forum. The 
rules to be proposed in respect of the extent of State im-
munity in this specified area should preclude cir-
cumstances in which the courts of a State would have 
jurisdiction in a case concerning a contract of employ-
ment performed outside its territory or, regardless of 
the place of performance, on account of a special ar-
rangement or regime, such as that governing civil ser-
vants or government employees in active service at an 
embassy or consulate or a comparable office accredited 
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in another country. In such circumstances, the ad-
ministrative tribunal or the civil service commission or 
any other analogous institution of the State employing 
the individual could still have an operable jurisdiction, 
and the applicable law is still the administrative law or 
the law governing the civil servants of the employing 
State as distinct from the labour law of the country in 
which the service is to be performed. 
3. THE QUESTION OF APPLICABLE LAW 
34. In private international law as well as in the 
borderland where it overlaps with public international 
law, the choice of applicable law is often indicative if 
not determinative of the preferred jurisdiction among 
the competing or concurrent competent authorities. The 
question of applicable law may accordingly be highly 
pertinent, especially when it is a specialized branch of 
the law peculiar to a special regime or system, such as 
the regulations regarding the staff of the Secretariat of 
the United Nations and the specialized agencies. The 
Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations is 
probably considered the chosen forum for disputes re-
garding administrative matters (pensions, promotion, 
leave, etc.) affecting members of the staff of the United 
Nations Secretariat. It is probably a preferred jurisdic-
tion compared with other competent local or territorial 
courts of law or a labour tribunal. The same could be 
said of the regulations applying to State employees, at 
least the higher-ranking officials, or the international 
staff in the case of international organizations. 
35. The choice of law may be expressed by the parties, 
which tends to suggest almost exclusively the choice of 
jurisdiction. With regard to civil servants and high-
ranking State employees, it is presumed that it is the ad-
ministrative law of the employer State that governs 
labour relations and that the court of law or ad-
ministrative tribunal of the employer State or sending 
State is the chosen forum, if not indeed the forum pro 
rogatum, alone competent to decide the issue. Ter-
ritorial courts or local labour courts, however substan-
tively competent to deal with such disputes, would likely 
be less conversant with the applicable labour laws of the 
sending State or the employer State. The question of ap-
plicable law in a given case must therefore be properly 
considered in this particular connection. 
36. Concurrence of jurisdiction exercisable by the ter-
ritorial court or the State of the forum and by the na-
tional court or the court of the sending State is further 
complicated by the concurrence of their respective ap-
plicable laws. In a clear case of applicable ad-
ministrative law of the sending State, because of the 
high offices of the civil servants or government 
employees in question, for example, the local labour 
court or even the territorial administrative tribunal or 
authorities may feel inclined to yield to the application 
of foreign administrative law and therefore may decline 
jurisdiction in favour of a more proper or more con-
venient forum, on the grounds perhaps of forum non 
conveniens, because of the special relationship or the 
special nature of the foreign administrative law. If, on 
the other hand, the case concerns local staff of lower 
rank and does not call for the application of foreign ad-
ministrative law, but more appropriately the applicable 
local labour law or the law governing contracts of 
employment in the State of the forum, then the ter-
ritorial court would not hesitate to exercise its com-
petent jurisdiction, being more certain of the applica-
tion of its own substantive law relating to the operation 
of contracts of employment, working conditions, terms 
of compensation, and so on. The question may ap-
propriately be asked whether and how far the territorial 
State wishes to impose its own labour laws and regula-
tions on all employment of services within its territory. 
4. THE QUESTION OF STATE IMMUNITY 
37. Only when the court in the State in which services 
under the contract of employment are to be performed 
considers that it has jurisdiction and that it is competent 
will it proceed to apply its own substantive law regard-
ing labour disputes and labour relations. Where the 
employer happens to be a foreign State or Government, 
the question of immunity comes into play. But, of 
course, in actual practice the foreign State being pro-
ceeded against does not normally wait until the court 
reaches that finding, but would be expected to raise a 
plea of State immunity in any event. Thus the court is 
called upon to decide the issue of State immunity quite 
often when there is not yet any necessity to do so, since, 
without the question of State immunity, the court could 
have easily declined jurisdiction on any of the grounds 
mentioned, such as lac~ of competence, forum non con-
veniens or choice of jurisdiction and choice of ap-
plicable law, for reasons of public policy, or because of 
the "act of State" doctrine. 
38. However, when the court is faced with the ques-
tion of State immunity in this specified area of "con-
tracts of employment", the first essential point which 
may determine the exercise or non-exercise of its 
jurisdiction relates to the existence of the governmental 
authority of the State, <2 in the exercise of which a cause 
of action has arisen. If, for instance, the dispute con-
cerns the appointment or non-appointment of an officer 
by a foreign State or by one of its organs, agencies or in-
strumentalities, then there is a clear case for State im-
munity because such appointment or non-appointment 
would have to result from an act in the exercise of the 
governmental authority of that foreign State or Govern-
ment. The same is true of the dismissal or suspension of 
an employee by a State or governmental agency, which 
could never be compelled to re-employ or reinstate an 
employee thus dismissed as a result of an act done in the 
exercise of governmental authority. It does not follow, 
however, that the legal consequences of dismissal in 
breach of a contract of employment are necessarily a 
result of an act done in the exercise of governmental 
authority. There appears to be an area, therefore, where 
the local courts can still exercise jurisdiction in pro-
ceedings against a foreign State as employer of a worker 
for services rendered in the territory of the State of the 
., See article 7, para. 3, in footnote 12 above. 
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forum and unconnected with the exercise of governmen-
tal authority by the employer State. To put it differ-
ently, the question could be phrased: how far is the 
sending State required to conform to local labour laws 
and regulations of the territorial State? 
B. The current practice of States 
1. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 
39. In contrast to the superabundance of judicial and 
governmental practice of States in the area of trading or 
commercial activity covered by article 12, H there have 
been relatively fewer judicial decisions and little 
evidence of State practice in regard to contracts of 
employment. Yet the adoption of the inductive method 
implies a search for guidance from State practice. None 
the less, a glance at State practice reveals an equally 
startling number of inconsistencies and contradictions, 
while the paucity of decisions precludes any reference to 
practice on a State-by-State basis. If the treatment of 
the exception of trading or commercial activity has been 
criticized for not covering the practice of all 165 coun-
tries, or for distorting it in some cases, the current prac-
tice of States with regard to contracts of employment 
can offer no greater comfort nor absolute proof ap-
proaching a universal or uniform State practice. It only 
indicates a deeper intrusion into a darker or greyer zone 
of greater controversy, and, if article 13 is to be at all 
meaningful, greater care and prudence must be applied: 
wild or sweeping statements would not be helpful. 
40. State practice in the specified area of contracts of 
employment appears to be comparatively recent, unlike 
the rich State practice concerning trading or commercial 
activities. This contrast is attributable to the fact that 
States have engaged in trading or commercial activities 
across or beyond their borders for a long time, resulting 
in litigations and judicial decisions in several jurisdic-
tions. On the other hand, the employment abroad of 
local personnel by an organ of State or one of its agen-
cies or instrumentalities in the exercise of its governmen-
tal authority has been a matter of relatively recent prac-
tice. Disputes concerning relations between servants and 
masters, or employees and foreign State employers, 
have not been too frequent. It is even more uncommon 
to find a recorded settlement by local judicial decision 
or other administrative adjudication. 
41. The stages of development of a separate branch of 
civil law or of the law of contract governing labour rela-
tions and labour disputes are far from being uniform. 
Indeed, many countries do not have a labour code or 
-special labour courts or tribunals for the settlement of 
labour disputes. Some systems have administrative 
tribunals to determine questions or to hear grievances 
from employees of their own Government but are not 
specifically equipped to apply foreign administrative 
laws or to extend their own administrative laws for the 
" See the fourth report of the Special Rapporteur (see footnote 2 
(d) above), paras. 49-)07. 
benefit of employees of foreign Governments. The cur-
rent enquiry is, however, limited to existing practice and 
does not investigate the causes of its scarcity. 
2. JUDICIAL PRACTICE 
42. Owing to the uneven stages of development of dif-
ferent internal laws governing the specified area of 
"contracts of employment", jurisprudence or case-law 
cannot be presented on a country-by-country basis; 
rather, the content may be treated topic by topic or by 
subtopic. However, a meaningful analysis of practice as 
evidence of the progress of legal developments will still 
have to be based on the inductive method, difficult as it 
may seem. 
(0) Appointment or employment by a State 
43. There appears to have developed a relatively more 
consistent trend in the case-law of States that the ques-
tion of appointment or employment of personnel of an 
office by a State or one of its organs, agencies or in-
strumentalities is immune from the jurisdiction of the 
territorial judicial authorities, provided of course that 
the activities of such agencies or instrumentalities are 
performed in the exercise of governmental authority." 
44. Italian jurisprudence is rich in examples of clear 
judicial pronouncements to the effect that the act of ap-
pointment or non-appointment of an employee, or the 
decision to employ or not to employ a person, by a 
foreign State agency is an act of public law essentially 
exempt from local jurisdiction. The act of appointment 
is often said to be performed in the exercise of govern-
mental functions.·$ Thus, in a decision rendered by the 
United Sections of the Supreme Court of Cassation in 
1947,.6 the Soviet Trade Delegation was held to be ex-
empt from jurisdiction in matters of employment of an 
Italian citizen, being acta jure imperii, notwithstanding 
the fact that the appointing authority was a separate 
legal entity, or for that matter a foreign corporation 
established by a State. Similarly, in a more recent case 
decided in 1955,47 the Court of Cassation declined 
jurisdiction in an action brought by an Italian citizen in 
respect of his employment by a United States military 
.. See article 7, para. 3, and the commentary thereto (see footnotes 
12 and 13 above); see also paras. 5-6 of the I?resent report. 
., The distinction between the "functions of the State in the exercise 
of its sovereign power, and its activity as a subject of rights of prop-
erty" was restated afresh in the judgment of the Court of Appeal of 
Genoa in Canale v. Governo Francese (1937) (Rivista di diritto inter-
nazionale (Rome), 29th year (1937), p. 81, with a critical note by 
C. Cereti; ibid., 30th year (1938), p. 226; Annual Digest and Reports 
of Public International Law Cases, 1935-1937 (London), vol. 8 
(1941), p. 237). 
•• Tani v. Rappresentanza commerciale in Italia del/'U.R.S.S. 
(1947) (II Foro Italiano (Rome), vol. LXXI (1948), p. 855; Annual 
Digest '" , 1948 (London), vol. 15 (1953), case No. 45, p. 141). 
., Department of the Army of the United States of America v. Gori 
Savellini (1955) (Rivista di diritto internazionale (Milan), vol. XXXIX 
(1956), pp. 91-92; International Law Reports, 1956 (London), vol. 23 
(1960), p.201). See also Alexeef v. Rappresentanza commerciale 
dell'U.R.S.S. (1932) (Giurisprudenza Italian a (Turin), vol. I (1933), 
p. 489), where no distinction was made between diplomatic and com-
mercial activities of the Trade Agency. 
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base established in Italy in accordance with the North 
Atlantic Treaty, this being an altivitiz pubblicistica con-
nected with the funzioni pubbliche 0 politiche of the 
United States Government." The act of appointment 
was necessarily performed in the exercise of governmen-
tal authority, and as such considered to be an atto di 
sovranitiz. 
45. In a different context, the French Conseil d'Etat 
regarded appointment of a French national to a position 
in UNESCO, as well as failure of the French Govern-
ment to support the claims of an ex-official of the In-
stitute of Intellectual Co-operation and his entitlement 
to a UNESCO position, as being outside the competence 
of the French authorities.·9 
brought by an employee of the Soviet Trade Delegation 
for wrongful dismissal. A decision of the French Con-
seil d'Etat in 1929 in another context also took the same 
line. 53 
(c) Employment or labour relations 
48. In spite of earlier hesitancy in the case-law, 54 re-
cent State practice appears to consider questions of 
labour relations or contracts of employment in 
substance as matter~ in regard to which foreign State 
agencies "are entitled to immunity, as long as it is 
established that the agencies in question performed ac-
tivities in the exercise of governmental authority. 51 Con-
tracts of employment were conceived by Italian judicial 
authorities as exceptions to the normal transactions be-
(b) Cases of dismissal tween a foreign State and local citizens amenable to the 
jurisdiction of Italian courts. 56 Viewed as atti di 
46. Dismissal cases are more abundant in State prac- sovranitiz, contracts of employment of employees of 
tice and point to the conclusion that the courts do not foreign Governments were exempted from the jurisdic-
have competence. The act of dismissal has been re- tion of the Italian courts which applied the most restric-
garded as an ex~rcise_ of sovereign power or govern- . . 1 f S' . Th . I 5 
mental authority rather than a breach or an ordinary--- tiv~pnnclp e 0 tate Immumty. us, m 956, 7 an ac-
tion brQught by Gori Savellini against a United States -
commercial or private contraa-. Italian case-law may be military base established in Italy was dismissed. In two 
cited in support of this proposition. It is all the more more recent cases, judicial pronouncements were even 
conclusive that Italian jurisprudence appears, from its more explicit. Thus, in De Rilis v. Governo degli Stati 
very early days, to be the most restrictive of all State Uniti d'America (1971)," immunity was upheld in an 
practice. action brought by De Ritis, a librarian with the United 
47. Thus immunity was upheld in an action for States Information Service (USIS) in Italy, having 
wrongful dismissal brought by an ex-employee of the regard to the substantive and objective contents of the 
Milan branch of the Soviet Trade Delegation in the Kaz- employment or service to be performed, however mod-
mann case, decided by the Italian Supreme Court in est. The Supreme Court considered USIS to be an over-
1933. 50 This decision became a leading precedent seas office of the United States Information Agency, 
followed by other Italian courts." A later decision by un ente od ufficio statale americano ... che agisce 
the United Sections of the Supreme Court of Cassation all'estero solto 10 direzione ed if controllo del Segretario 
in the Tani case in 1947 52 must be regarded as final and di Stato ... per la persecuzione di fini pubblici sovrani 
decisive on this point. It also confirmed the decision of della Stato americana come tale. 59 The Court held De 
the Appellate Court of Milan rejecting the action Ritis to be an "employee of the United States Govern-
ment" and secondo concelti propri del nostro diritto 
pubblico ma indubbiamente applicabili anche alia fat-
tispecie ... perche I'impiegato di uno Stato e per de/ini-
zione impiegato pubblico. 60 Although the contract of 
employment was undoubtedly un rapporto di lavoro, it 
.J Cf. De Ritis v. Governo degli Stati Uniti d'America (1971) 
(Rivista ... ,vol. LV (1972), p. 483) and Luna v. Repubblica socialista 
di Romania (1974) (ibid., vol. LVIII (1975), p. 597). Contrast, 
however, the decisions in De Semenoffv. Amministrazione delle Fer-
rovie dello Stato della Norvegia (1935, 1936) (ibid., 29th year (1937), 
p. 224; Annual Digest ... , 1935-1937, op. cit., case No. 92, p. 234), 
concerning a case of employment by the State railways of a foreign 
Government operating in Italy, and in Slomnitzky v. Rappresentanza 
commerciale dell'U.R.S.S. (1932) (Annual Digest ... , 1931-1932 
(London) vol. 6 (1938), case No. 86, p. 169). 
•• Weiss v. Institute of Intellectual Co-operation (1953) (Journal du 
droit international (Clunet) (Paris), vol. 81 (1954), p. 745, with a note 
by P. Huet). 
.. Rappresentanza commerciale deIl'U.R.S.S. v. Kazmann (1933) 
(Rivista ... ,25th year (1933), p. 240; Annual Digest ... , 1933-1934 
(London), vol. 7 (1940), case No. 69, p. 178). 
II See, for example, Little v. Riccio e Fischer (Court of Appeal of 
Naples, 1933) (Rivista ... ,26th year (1934), p. 110), (Court of Cassa-
tion, 1934) (Annual Digest ... , 1933-1934, op. cit., case No. 68, 
p. 177); the Court of Appeal of Naples and the Court of Cassation 
disclaimed jurisdiction in this action for wrongful dismissal by Riccio, 
an employee in a cemetery the property of the British Crown and 
"maintained by Great Britain jure imperii for the benefit of her na-
tionals as such, and not for them as individuals". Cf. Mazzucchi 
v. Consolato Americano (1931) (Annual Digest '" , 1931-1932, op. 
cit., case No. 186, p. 336). 
" See footnote 46 above; an illuminating judgment may be found in 
Annual Digest ... , 1948, pp. 145-146. 
.. The Marthoud case (1929) (Recueil des arrets du Conseil d'Etat 
(Paris, Sirey, 1929), vol. 99, p. 409). 
.. Earlier decisions by Italian courts denied immunity on the 
grounds that contracts of employment were private-law transactions, 
while the act of dismissing or appointing a government employee or a 
civil servant was invariably regarded as an exercise of sovereign 
authority. See, for example, De Semenoffv. Amministrazione delle 
Ferrovie dello Stato della Norvegia (1935, 1936) (footnote 48 above). 
Cf. also Ferrovie Federali Svizzere v. Commune di Tronzano (1929) 
(II Foro Italiano, vol. LlV (1929), p. 1146; Annual Digest ... , 
1929-1930 (London), vol. 5 (1935), p. 124), where immunity was 
denied to the Swiss Federal Railways. 
.. See S. Sucharitkul, State Immunities and Trading Activities in In-
ternational Law (London, Stevens, 1959), pp. 239-242. 
.. See Sucharitkul, "Immunities of foreign States before national 
authorities", Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of Interna-
tional Law, 1976-1 (Leyden, Sijthoff, 1977), vol. 149, pp. 130-132. 
01 See footnote 47 above. 
.. See footnote 48 above. 
n Rivista ... , vol. LV (1972), p. 485. 
•• Ibid., p. 486. 
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I was not un rapporto di diritto privato. 61 In another 
case, Luna v. Repubblica socialista di Romania 
(1974),62 concerning an employment contract concluded 
by an economic agency forming part of the Romanian 
Embassy in Rome, immunity of the Socialist Republic 
of Romania was upheld. The Supreme Court dismissed 
Luna's claim for 7,799,212 lire as compensation for 
remuneration based on the employment contract. The 
court regarded such labour relations as being outside 
Italian jurisdiction, qualora 10 Stato abbia agito come 
soggetto di diritto internazionale, /a giurisdizione 
italiana non pub sussistere, in virtu della norma con-
suetudinaria di diritto internazionale, generalmente 
riconosciuta, sull'immunita giurisdizionale degli Stati 
esteri .... 63 Looking at the objective elements, the 
Court held that if rapporto d'impiego in contestazione 
va senz'altro inquadrato nell'ambito dell'attivita che 10 
Stato romeno (quale soggetto di diritto internazionale) 
svolge in Italia per propri fini istituzionali ... 64 
(d) Absence of jurisdiction 
49. There appears, therefore, to be no consistent case-
law anywhere pointing to the conclusion that contracts 
of employment or any aspect thereof could constitute an 
exception to State immunity. On the contrary, even in 
the most limited application of the principle of State 
immunity, as in the case-law of Italy, immunity is 
recognized and fairly consistently applied in all cases, 
covering appointment, dismissal and actions for com-
pensation or for breach of other terms of the employ-
ment or service contract. There appears to be a general 
absence of jurisdiction or reluctance to exercise jurisdic-
tion in the field of labour relations. 
3. GOVERNMENTAL PRACTICE 
50. Further examination is warranted to see whether, 
outside the case-law, there is anywhere any support for 
restricting immunity in regard to employment contracts. 
(a) National legislation 
5 I. In the absence of judicial decisions indicating ac-
ceptance of "contracts of employment" as an exception 
to State immunity, it is only possible to conjecture that, 
in the countries which have adopted national legislation 
restricting immunity in this specified area of "contracts 
of employment" or "labour relations", the courts will 
in future have to apply their national legislation. 
52. On the basis of this assumption, it is interesting to 
note that section 4 of the United Kingdom State Im-
munity Act 19786l contains such a provision. It reads: 
" Ibid., p. 485. See also, in regard to employment cases, judgment 
No. 467 of 1964 concerning the United States Army-Southern Euro-
pean Task Force, and judgment No. 3160 of 1959 concerning a 
Venezuelan naval mission (ibid.). 
" See footnote 48 above. 
., Rillista ... , vol. LVIII (1975), p. 599. 
"Ibid. 
" United Kingdom, The Public General Acts, 1978, part I. chap. 
33, p. 715 (reproduced in United Nations. Materials on Jurisdictional 
Immunities ... , pp. 41 et seq.). 
Exceptions from immunity 
4. (I) A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to a 
contract of employment between the State and an individual where the 
contract was made in the United Kingdom or the work is to be wholly 
or partly performed there. 
(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (4) below. this section does not ap-
ply if: 
(a) at the time when the proceedings are brought the individual is a 
national of the State concerned; or 
(b) at the time when the contract was made the individual was 
neither a national of the United Kingdom nor habitually resi-
dent there; or 
(e) the parties to the contract have otherwise agreed in writing. 
(3) Where the work is for an office. agency or establishment main-
tained by the State in the United Kingdom for commercial purposes. 
subsection (2) (a) and (b) above do not exclude the application of this 
section unless the individual was. at the time when the contract was 
made. habitually resident in that State. 
(4) Subsection (2) (c) above does not exclude the application of this 
section where the law of the United Kingdom requires the proceedings 
to be brought before a court of the United Kingdom. 
(5) In subsection (2) (b) above "national of the United Kingdom" 
means a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies. a person who is 
a British subject by virtue of section 2. 13 or 16 of the British Na-
tionality Act 1948 or by virtue of the British Nationality Act 1965. a 
British protected person within the meaning of the said Act of 1948 or 
a citizen of Southern Rhodesia. 
(6) In this section "proceedings relating to a contract of employ-
ment" includes proceedings between the parties to such a contract in 
respect of any statutory rights or duties to which they are entitled or 
subject as employer or employee. 
53. While this provision has no equivalent in the 
United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 
1976,66 nor in Canada's State Immunity Act of 1982,67 it 
appears to have been followed very closely in section 6 
of Singapore's State Immunity Act, 1979,61 in section 6 
of the State Immunity Ordinance, 1981 of Pakistan,69 
and in section 5 of the South African Foreign States Im-
munities Act, 1981. 70 Since the practice of English 
courts has, in the past, been associated with a more ab-
solute principle of State immunity, this change of at-
titude, which as been followed in a number of important 
Commonwealth countries applying common law, is 
bound to have far-reaching influence in the develop-
ment of future practice, not only in common-law 
jurisdictions. The restrictive practice in this particular 
area of "contracts of employment" is capable of 
gathering momentum. 7 1 
.. United States Code, 1976 Edition, vol. 8, title 28, chap. 97. 
p. 206 (idem. pp. 55 et seq.). 
" "Act to provide for State immunity in Canadian courts". which 
came into force on 15 July 1982 (The Canada Gazette, Part 111 
(Ottawa). vol. 6. No. 15 (22 June 1982). p. 2949, chap. 95). 
.. Entitled "Act to make provision with respect to proceedings in 
Singapore by or against other States. and for purposes connected 
therewith". of 26 October 1979 (reproduced in United Nations. 
Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities .... pp. 28 et seq.). 
.. The Gazette of Pakistan (Islamabad). II March 1981 (idem • 
pp. 20 et seq.). 
,. The Act came into force on 6 October 1981 (idem. pp. 34 et seq.). 
" There is a distinct possibility that other countries. in the Carib-
bean and elsewhere, such as SI. Kitts and Trinidad and Tobago, will 
follow this tendency. 




54. It is also to be ~~sumed that the practice of the 
States which have ratIfIed the 1972 European Conven-
tion on State Immunity,72 such as Austria,73 Belgium" 
and Cyprus, B like the United Kingdom, will be restric-
tive in this area. 
(b) International conventions 
(i) 1972 European Convention on State Immunity 
55. The 1972 European Convention on State Immun-
ity came into force in accordance with article 36, 
paragraph 2, between Austria, Belgiu~ and Cy~rus ~n 
II June 1976. Article 5 of the ConventIon contaInS Vlf-
tually the same provisions as section 4 of the United 
Kingdom State Immunity Act 1978 intended to give ef-
fect to the Convention" and reads as follows. 
Article 5 
I. A Contracting State cannot claim immunity from the jurisdic· 
tion of a court of another Contracting State if the proceedings relate 
to a contract of employment between the State and an individual 
where the work has to be performed on the territory of the State of the 
forum. 
2. Paragraph I shall not apply where: 
(0) the individual is a national of the employing State at the time 
when the proceedings are brought; 
(b) at the time when the contract was entered into the individual 
was neither a national of the State of the forum nor habitually resident 
in that State; or 
(e) the parties to the contract have otherwise agreed in writing, 
unless, in accordance with the law of the State of the forum, the courts 
of that State have exclusive jurisdiction by reason of the subject· 
matter. 
3. Where the work is done for an office, agency or other establish· 
ment referred to in Article 7, paragaphs 2 (0) and (b) of the present ar· 
ticle apply only if, at the time the contract was entered into, the in· 
dividual had his habitual residence in the Contracting State which 
employs him. 
(ii) Inter-American Draft Convention on Jurisdictional 
Immunity of States 
56. While the fullest implications of such a provision 
cannot yet be assessed, its snowballing effect is reflected 
in an increasing amount of legislation in various coun-
tries, albeit not always uniform. Worthy of notice at 
this juncture is the recent, Inter-American Draft Con-
vention on Jurisdictional Immunity of States (1983).77 
Article 6 contains the following provision restricting im-
munity: 
" See footnote 39 above. 
" See the declarations by Austria giving effect to the provisions of 
the Convention, in United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictional Im-
munities .... p. 5. Austria ratified the Convention on 10 July 1974. 
" Belgium ratified the Convention on 27 July 1975. 
" Cyprus ratified the Convention on 10 March 1976. 
" See also the almost identical formulations in the corresponding 
provisions of national legislation. 
" Draft approved by the Inter·American Juridical Committee, Rio 
de Janeiro, on 21 January 1983 (OEA/Ser.G-CP/doc.1352183, of 30 
March 1983). See also International Legal Materials (Washington, 
D.c.), vol. XXII, No.2 (March 1983), p. 292 . 
Article 6 
States shall not claim immunity from jurisdiction either: 
(0) in labour affairs or employment contracts between any State 
and one or more individuals, when the work is performed in the forum 
State; 
4. INTERNATIONAL OPINION 
57. Opinions of writers on the question of contracts of 
employment have been very scanty. Traditionally, this 
specific area has been regarded as more exclusively 
within the scope of the administrative law of the 
employing State and therefore more properly pertaining 
to the jurisdiction of that State. 7I Commentaries by in-
dividual writers on national legislation and international 
conventions have been somewhat varied. The critique 
has centred upon the wording of the texts, which are un-
necessarily complex and difficult of appreciation. 79 It is, 
of course, the sovereign right of any State to legislate on 
the subject-matter by prescribing the conditions under 
which foreign States are allowed to engage in certain ac-
tivities within its territory. Each State has the inherent 
power, subject to treaty obligations, to exclude from its 
territory foreign public agencies, including even 
diplomatic representation. 10 
58. It is not surprising to see a restrIctive trend 
reflected in the draft articles for a convention on State 
immunity proposed by the International Committee on 
State Immunity and adopted by the International Law 
Association at Montreal in 1982.11 This draft contains 
the following provision: 
Article III. Exceptions to immunity from adjudication 
A foreign State shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the 
forum State to adjudicate in the following instances inter olio: 
C. Where the foreign State enters into a contract for employment 
in the forum State, or where work under such a contract is to 
be performed wholly or partly in the forum State and the pro· 
ceedings relate to the contract. This provision shall not apply 
if: 
I. At the time proceedings are brought the employee is ana· 
tional of the foreign State; or 
"On this question, see, for example, F. Seyersted, "Jurisdiction 
over organs and officials of States, the Holy See and intergovernmen· 
tal organizations", The International and Comparative Low Quar· 
terly (London), vol. 14 (1965), pp. 31-82 and 493-527. 
" See, for example, F. A. Mann, "The State Immunity Act 1978", 
The British Year Book of International Low. 1979 (London), vol. 50, 
p.54. 
10 See, for example, I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International 
Law (3rd ed.) (Oxford. Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 334: 
"If a State chooses. it could enact a law governing immunities of 
foreign States which would enumerate those acts which would involve 
acceptance of the local jurisdiction .... States would thus be given a 
licence to operate within the jurisdiction with express conditions and 
the basis of sovereign immunity, as explained in The Schooner 'Ex-
change', would be observed." See also I. Sinclair, "The law of 
sovereign immunity: Recent developments", Collected Courses ... , 
1980·11 (Alphen aan den Rijn, Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1981), 
vol. 167, pp. 214·216. 
" See ILA, Report of the Sixtieth Conference. Montreal, 1982 
(London, 1983), pp. 5·10, resolution No.6: "State Immunity". 
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2. At the time the contract for employment was made the 
employee was neither a national nor a permanent resident 
of the forum State; or 
3. The employer and employee have otherwise. agreed in 
writing." 
5. AN EMERGING TREND 
59. While the current practice of States is relatively 
silent on contracts of employment as a possible area of 
exceptions to State immunity, there appears to be an 
emerging trend in favour of limitation in this darkest 
area of the "grey zones". The choices available depend 
on the eventual outcome of legal developments in 
labour affairs and labour relations. In an endeavour to 
restate the law in the process of its progressive develop-
ment, utmost care should be taken to avoid interference 
with the application of foreign administrative law, while 
maintaining reasonable standards of labour conditions 
in employment contracts within the State of the forum. 
At the same time, nothing should be attempted that 
would aggravate existing problems of unemployment in 
a given society. 
60. All things considered, an emerging trend appears 
to favour the application of local labour law in regard to 
recruitment of the available labour force within a coun-
try, and consequently to encourage the exercise of ter-
ritorial jurisdiction at the expense of jurisdictional im-
munities of foreign States. It is not unnatural in such 
endeavours to adopt national legislation which tends to 
prescribe also the scope and limits of exercisable 
jurisdiction in addition to the restriction of State im-
munity in this specified area. It is clear that private-law 
jurisdiction has to be firmly established before the ques-
tion of jurisdictional immunity arises to be resolved. 
Regional conventions tend to draw also on national 
jurisdiction, which should be established in a uniform 
manner so as to avoid any unnecessary vacuum or 
overlapping of competence. 
C. Formulation of draft article 13 
61. The principle to be incorporated in the draft article 
should reflect the fluid state of legal developments. 
Flexibility and balanced considerations should guide 
any effort to formulate a draft article on "contracts of 
employment". The possibility should be left open for 
this exception to assert itself in State practice. On the 
other hand, this should not constitute any intrusion into 
the sphere of administrative law or the administrative 
functions of government officials. Rather, a mild incen-
tive could be introduced to encourage conformity with 
local labour law and improve social conditions, labour 
relations and the employment outlook. Two criteria are 
eligible for support.. First, the nationality of the 
employee could be taken into consideration as an ele-
ment in favour of the application of the administrative 
12 Ibid., pp. 7-8. An interesting commentary on this provision may 
be found in the final report (24 June 1982) of the International Com-
mittee on State Immunity, chaired by Mr. M. Leigh; see ILA, The 
ILA Montreal Draft Convention on State Immunity (London, 1983), 
pp. 51-52, para. 25. 
law of the employing State or, as the case may be, of the 
application of the labour law of the territorial State. 
The second criterion is residence in the State of the 
forum, which could be qualified as regular, habitual or 
permanent, not so much as the basis for jurisdiction in 
private international law , but more exactly as justifica-
tion for the exercise of existing territorial jurisdiction or 
predilection in favour of the territorial connections, to 
ensure protection of the nationals and alien residents of 
the forum State. 
62. Article 13 might read as follows: 
Article 13. Contracts of employment 
1. Unless otherwise agreed, a State is not immune 
from the jurisdiction of the courts of another State in 
respect of proceedings relating to a "contract of 
employment" of a national or resident of that other 
State for work to be performed there. 
2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if: 
(a) the proceedings relate to failure to employ an in-
dividual or dismissal of an employee; 
(b) the employee is a national of the employing State 
at the time the proceedings are brought; 
(c) the employee was neither a national nor a resident 
of the State of the forum at the time of employment; or 
(d) the employee has otherwise agreed in writing, 
unless, in accordance with the law of the State of the 
forum, the courts of that State have exclusive jurisdic-
tion by reason of the subject-matter. 
ARTICLE 14 (Personal Injuries and damagf to property) 
A. General considerations 
1. SCOPE OF "PERSONAL INJURIES AND DAMAGE TO PROP-
ERTY" AS AN EXCEPTION TO STATE IMMUNITY 
63. The purpose of draft article 14 is to examine poss-
ible limitations of State immunity in the area of "per-
sonal injuries and damage to property". This area 
covers the liability of a State or one of its organs, agen-
cies or instrumentalities to pay damages or monetary 
compensation in respect of an act or omission at-
tributable to the State, resulting in personal injury 
(physical damage) to a natural person or physical 
damage to property as distinct from depreciation of its 
value. In common-law jurisdictions, such causes of ac-
tion may be included under the heading of tortious 
liability. For the purposes of jurisdictional immunity, 
they may be categorized as non-commercial tort. In 
civil-law and other jurisdictions, a similar heading may 
be entitled civil responsibility for physical damage to 
persons resulting in bodily harm, personal injuries or 
death, and physical damage to tangible movable or im-
movable property as opposed to infringements of 
property rights, or libel ?r other forms of defamation. 
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64, Without further inquiry, into t,he niceties of 
arious internal laws on the subject, which may cover a 
:ide area of civil liability for physical damage to per-
sons and property, one could mention, for example, 
negligence or nuisance in the common-law system, 
where damage is occasioned by an act or omission, or 
cases of stricter liability for occupation of land and 
premises, or liability for dangerous animals or for 
possession and transport of dangerous substances. In 
the strictest application of liability without fault, an ac-
tion may lie not only for malfeasance or misfeasance or, 
indeed, for non-feasance but also for failure to prevent 
the occurrence of damage. The duty of care may vary in 
standard and quality depending on the strictness of 
liability and the degree of protection provided by the in-
ternallaw for the injured party, be it physical injury to 
the person or damage to property. The damage could be 
the result of a wilful act, neglect, omission or 
negligence, or, indeed, it could be unintended or even 
accidental. The causes of action under this heading or 
possible remedies for damage grouped under "personal 
injuries and damage to property" include a wide variety 
of circumstances giving rise to legal relief for the injured 
party, including not only the persons injured, but also, 
in the event of consequent death, their heirs and depen-
dants. As for damage to property, similar causes of ac-
tion may be available to the owner, user or possessor or 
the combination of such right-holders. 
65. The purpose of article 14 is therefore to limit the 
application of jurisdictional immunity in respect of per-
sonal injuries and damage to property caused by an act 
or omission attributable to a foreign State or to one of 
its organs, agencies or instrumentalities. The restriction 
operates where there is State immunity, that is to say 
even where the agency or instrumentality of a foreign 
State has been acting in the exercise of governmental 
power, so long only as the personal injury or damage to 
property occurred in the territory of the State of the 
forum, The extent of damage or remoteness thereof and 
the types of available redress in various internal laws lie 
outside the ambit of the present study. 
2. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR JURISDICTION 
66. The exception of "personal injuries and physical 
damage to property" is not an issue, or does not arise, 
where there is no question of State immunity from the 
jurisdiction of the courts of another State. By the same 
token, the question of State immunity should not be 
raised, or indeed need not be raised, when the causes of 
action are outside the jurisdiction of the courts, or when 
the courts before which proceedings have been brought 
have no jurisdiction, because of the subject-matter or 
for territorial reasons, or are otherwise not competent 
to consider and decide the case in question. It is signifi-
cant to note at this juncture that, in order to avoid un-
necessary inquiry into the grounds or legal bases for 
jurisdiction in respect of tort or civil liability for per-
sonal injuries and damage to property, whether wilful, 
malicious or merely accidental, an agreed basis or an 
unchallenged or undoubted basis for jurisdiction is ob-
ViOUSly the locus delicti commissi. 
67. Of course, under the rules of private international 
law, there are possible competing criteria for the ex-
istence or foundation of jurisdiction in the circum-
stances under examination, such as the nationality of 
the injured person, the place where the plaintiff suffered 
injury as opposed to or distinct from the place where the 
act or omission occurred. As regards damage to prop-
erty, jurisdiction may be founded on the basis of the 
physical situation (situs) of the immovable or movable 
property damaged, as opposed to or distinct from the 
place where the wrongful act or omission was commit-
ted or where negligence or neglect of the required duty 
of care occurred. It will be seen, quite correctly and not 
without well-founded reason, that national legislation 
and regional conventions containing provisions on this 
particular exception invariably specify the pre-existence 
of legitimate jurisdiction based on the locus delicti com-
missi and the eventual and justifiable exercise of such 
jurisdiction, even in respect of damage resulting from 
activities normally categorized as acta jure imperii, and 
also, in any event, from activities of a non-commercial 
character, whether or not classified as acta jure ges-
tionis. The distinction between jus imperii and jus ges-
tionis, or the two types of activities attributable to the 
State, appears to have little or no bearing in regard to 
this exception, which is designed to allow normal pro-
ceedings to lie and to provide relief for the individual 
who has suffered an otherwise actionable physical 
damage to his own person or his deceased ancestor or to 
his property. The cause of action relates to the occur-
rence or infliction of physical damage for which a 
foreign State is answerable, although local judicial 
authorities have hitherto been reluctant to exercise 
jurisdiction. 
3. THE BASIS FOR THE EXERCISE OF 
JURISDICTION OR NON-IMMUNITY 
68. It should be stated at the outset that, whatever the 
legal basis for the existence or assumption of jurisdic-
tion by the forum loci delicti commissi or the applica-
tion of the lex loci delicti commissi, which may not be 
challenged by other competing jurisdictions or the 
choice of other applicable laws, the basis for actual ex-
ercise of jurisdiction when the act or omission com-
plained of is attributable to a foreign State cannot be 
found in customary international law. It will be seen 
that the exercise of jurisdiction in proceedings involving 
a foreign State as a defendant is not warranted in the 
traditional practice of States. There appear, never-
theless, to be impelling reasons for an emerging trend in 
the recent case-law of countries which have adopted na-
tional legislation restricting immunity in this specified 
area to apply a restrictive doctrine whereby the courts 
may exercise jurisdiction in cases involving personal in-
juries or damage to property in the territory of the State 
of the forum. 
69. Many theoretical justifications could be advanced 
in support of the exercise of jurisdiction, or for the 
absence of State immunity, in such circumstances. 
Whatever the activities of a State giving rise to personal 
injuries or damage to property within the territory of 
r 
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another State, whether in connection with acta jure im-
perii or acta jure gestionis, the fact remains that injuries 
have been inflicted upon and suffered by innocent per-
sons, whether the act or omission was deliberate or 
unintentional or, indeed, negligent or accidental. The 
exercise of jurisdiction by the court of the place where 
the damage has occurred is probably the best guarantee 
of sound and swift justice. Adequate relief can be ex-
pected as the court is in reality a forum conveniens or, 
indeed, a most practical and convenient judicial 
authority with an unchallenged claim to exercise 
jurisdiction and facilities to establish or disprove 
evidence of liability and to assess compensation. Ques-
tions of causation or remoteness of damage as well as 
the quantum of retribution of measure of damages can 
best be determined by the competent forum of the place 
where the damage occurred and in accordance with the 
law of that place (lex locI). 
70. It goes without saying that the reverse is equally 
convincing. Non-exercise of jurisdiction in such a case . 
may result in a vacuum. Not only will there be a short-
age of a more appropriate law to be applied, but also a 
more suitable court of competence will not easily be 
found to try the case, which may be falling between two 
stools. The absence of competent judicial authority and 
lack of applicable law would leave the injured party 
remediless and without adequate relief or possible 
recourse, except at the mercy of the foreign State, which 
might or might not feel obliged to pay compensation, 
either on a voluntary basis or ex gratia. In the interests 
of the rule of law and of justice, normal legal remedies 
should continue to be available, regardless of the public 
or private character of the defendant. This is easier said 
than done, for, in actual practice, as will be seen below, 
the courts have tried hard to restrict immunity in this 
specific area, basing their restriction on the type of ac-
tivities carried on by the State agencies or instrumen-
talities concerned, or the direct connection with State 
activities which may be said to be genuinely acta jure 
imperii as opposed to acta jure gestionis. The results 
have been not altogether clear and apparently far from 
certain. The practice of States remains to be closely con-
sulted on this particular point. 
71. Whatever the emerging trend in State practice, the 
restrictive theories have sought to qualify or limit State 
immunity on the grounds, inter alia, that the tortious 
liability of a foreign State should be locally justiciable if 
the damage to property, death or personal injuries have 
occurred in the territory of the forum. The main pur-
pose is the protection of the injured parties, whether 
they happen to be nationals or residents of the State of 
the forum, or indeed aliens or tourists temporarily in the 
territory, which is nevertheless bound to afford a 
reasonable measure of legal protection for the safety 
and security of their persons as well as their tangible 
belongings. 
72. The sovereignty of the State responsible or liable 
for the damage incurred by the injured individual is not 
directly at stake in most cases. A State conducting ac-
tivities in the territory of another State is obliged to 
respect local laws and regulations and to abide by all 
ground rules. In case of infraction or violation of local 
laws, with or without intent, the liability to pay compen-
sation for damage should be accompanied by actual 
payment. In particular, the primary liability of the State 
in most cases of road accidents would be replaced or ab-
sorbed by insurance coverage under the existing re-
quirements of most local traffic regulations. Payment 
of compensation by an insurance company on behalf of 
a foreign State is no longer regarded as an affront to 
anyone, neither to the foreign State nor to the host 
Government. All parties should be satisfied, especially 
the aggrieved individuals who have been injured in a 
motor accident. 
73. The areas specified as personal injuries and 
damage to property are mainly concerned with acciden-
tal death, personal injuries or damage to property such 
as vehicles or fixed objects involved in a highway colli-
sion. Their scope is none the less somewhat wider, 
covering also cases such as assault and battery, 
malicious damage to property, arson and even murder 
or political assassination. Justice should not only be 
done but should also be seen to be done. 
74. In an eagerness to mete out justice, care should be 
taken lest a fundamental principle of international law , 
namely the principle of State immunity, be made an 
object of sacrifice without sufficient cause or true 
justification. While, in general, it is possible to conceive 
of day-to-day activities of States which could be covered 
by an insurance policy in case of fire or accident or 
other natural disaster or calamity attributable to an 
agency or instrumentality of a State, the possibility that 
State immunity is still needed should not be precluded, 
particularly in cases where the State has performed an 
act exclusively in the domain of the laws of war, such 
as in military operations or military exercises or 
manreuvres, or indeed in operations to quell riots, 
disturbances, civil war or civil strife, which are not 
generally covered by peacetime insurance. 
75. The sovereignty or governmental authority of a 
foreign State is not being challenged when, like any 
other responsible party, the State answerable for the 
physical damage to persons or property is called upon to 
come to the aid and assistance of the injured party. To 
be humane and merciful is not inconsistent with 
statehood or sovereignty. Humanity also deserves the 
protection of international law. To protect the integrity 
and security of the individual and his property is the 
duty of every territorial State. To allow an insurance 
company to settle claims against a foreign Government 
is not a derogation of any sovereign right or govern-
mental power. Social welfare requires that every person 
should be safe and secure and that personal injuries be 
accorded the necessary remedies. Damage to tangible 
property should also be made good by the responsible 
party, whoever that may be. A State is a highly respect-
able and very responsible party in this context. No ques-
tion of sovereign equality is really involved. 
r 
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B. The practice of States 
1. JUDICIAL PRACTICE PRIOR TO NATIONAL LEGISLATION 
76 Before the intervention by legislatures in the 1970s 
and, indeed, prior t~ the adoption .and rat.i~cation of in-
ternational conventIOns on State ImmUnIties, the prac-
tice of States had been neither uniform nor consistent. 
The exception of "personal injuries and damage to 
property" is relatively unknown in those jurisdictions 
applying a more "absolute" principle of immunity, 
mainly the common-law countries, such as the United 
Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand and other members of the 
commonwealth. The practice of socialist countries in 
this area is virtually unknown. On the whole, there has 
been very little evidence of State practice allowing or 
disallowing State immunity in respect of proceedings for 
"personal injuries and damage to property" . 
77. It is noteworthy, nevertheless, that in a number of 
countries where judicial practice has tended to favour a 
less absolute or a more restrictive principle of State im-
munity, attempts have been made to justify the exercise 
of jurisdiction by competent courts on the grounds that 
the act or omission in question relates to State acts jure 
gestionis or, at any rate, not to acts jure imperii. On the 
other hand, in the same "restrictive" jurisdictions, im-
munity has been upheld wherever the courts have found 
the activities giving rise to damage to property or per-
sonal injuries to have been conducted jure imperii. 
78. Thus, in a Belgian case, S.A. "Eau, gaz, electricite 
et applications" v. Ojjice d'aide mutuelle (1956),13 the 
Court of Appeal of Brussels upheld a plea of immunity 
in proceedings arising out of a motor accident which 
had occurred in March 1945 involving a British military 
truck carrying troops back from leave. At the time of 
the accident, the troops were engaged in belligerent 
operations in Belgium. The court decided that: 
As far as allied belligerents who carry out operations of war on 
Belgian territory are concerned, the immunity from jurisdiction of 
foreign States acting jure imperii prevents their being sued in Belgian 
courts ... 
79. The Court of Appeal of Schleswig in the Federal 
Republic of Germany adopted this general approach 
and granted jurisdictional immunity in a 1957 case in-
volving the immunity from jurisdiction of the United 
Kingdom." The plaintiff, a haulage contractor, claimed 
to have suffered injury to his health when performing 
his part of the contract for the recovery of certain arms 
and military plans in the Soviet zone. The court found a 
close link between the events giving rise to the plaintiff's 
claim and the performance of sovereign functions by the 
British Army. 
80. In this connection, following the restrictive trend 
in the practice of many States, Egyptian courts have 
" Pasicrisie beige (Brussels), vol. 144 (1957), part 2, p. 88; Interna-
tional Law Reports, 1956 (London), vol. 23 (1960), p. 205. 
.. Ibid., p. 207. 
.. Immunity of United Kingdom from jurisdiction (Germany) 
(1957) (International Law Reports, 1957 (London), vol. 24 (1961), 
P.207). 
consistently allowed immunity from jurisdiction in 
repect of acts jure imperii. There have been a number of 
cases concerning acts of members of armed forces of a 
foreign State in Egypt. The courts have frequently 
allowed immunity in cases of tort-accident or collision 
between private cars and army vehicles being driven by 
officials of a foreign State in the exercise of their public 
duty,l6 On the other hand, Egyptian courts have denied 
immunity in respect of crimes committed by members of 
foreign armed forces. when not "on duty"." Thus, in 
Guebali v. Colonel Mei, II it was held that the French 
Army had no immunity from civil jurisdiction even in 
matters relating to a military mission,l9 
81. In a more recent decision involving a motor acci-
dent caused by negligent driving of a car owned by a 
foreign Government, the Austrian Supreme Court 
delivered an illuminating judgment based on interesting 
analysis of the crucial acts. Thus, in Holubek 
v, Government oj the United States (1961),90 it was 
argued for the defendant that the carriage of mail for 
and on behalf of the United States Embassy constituted 
the performance of a "sovereign act" by the United 
States Government. The Austrian Supreme Court, ap-
plying a distinction between acta jure imperii and acta 
jure gestionis, 9 1 ruled that the act on which the plaintiff 
.. See, for example, Dame Gali/a Bassionni Amrane v. G. S. John 
Esq. (1932) (Journal du droit international (Clunet) (Paris), vol. 62 
(1935), p. 195; Annual Digest ... , 1931-1932, op. cit., case No. 90, 
p. 174; Annual Digest ... , 1933-1934, op. cit., case No. 74, p. 187); 
cf. the later case of Joseph Abouteboul v. Etat hellenique (1948) (The 
American Journal of International Law (Washington, D.C.), vol. 44 
(1950), p. 420), where immunity appears to have been correctly 
recognized with regard to acts performed by State agents not only 
while on duty or on mission, but also in the exercise of a public duty. 
"See, for example, Ministere public v. Constantin Tsoukharis 
(1943) (Bulletin de legislation et de jurisprudence egyptiennes 
(Alexandria), vol. 55 (1942-1943), p. 89; Annual Digest ... , 1943-
1945 (London), vol. 12 (1949), case No. 40, p. 150); Efstratios 
Gounaris v. Ministere public (1943) (Bulletin de legislation et de jur-
isprudence egyptiennes ... (1942-1943), p. 156; Annual Digest ... , 
1943-1945, op. cit., case No. 41, p. 152); Manuel Malero v. Ministere 
public (1943) (Bulletin de legislation et de jurisprudence 
egyptiennes ... (1942-1943), pp. 41 and 125; Annual Digest ... , 
1943-1945, op. cit., case No. 42, p. 154). See also Georges Trian-
dafi/ou v. Ministere public (1942) (The American Journal of Interna-
tional Law (Washington, D.C.), vol. 39 (1945), p. 345). 
II Dame Sofia Guebali v. Colonel Mei (1943) (Bulletin de legislation 
et de jurisprudence egyptiennes ... (1942-1943), p. 120; Annual 
Digest .. , , 1943-1945, op. cit., case No. 44, p. 164). 
.. Cf. Henon v. Gouvernement egyptien (1947) (Bulletin de legisla-
tion et de jurisprudence egyptiennes (Alexandria), vol. 59 (1946-1947), 
p. 225; Annual Digest ... , 1947 (London), vol. 14 (1951), case No. 
28, p. 78), where it was held that agents of a foreign Government were 
immune from jurisdiction with regard to the requisition of 
a villa by order of a foreign government department. 
•• Juristische Blaller (Vienna), vol. 84 (1962), p. 43; International 
Law Reports (London), vol. 40 (1970), p. 73; the judgment of the 
Supreme Court is reproduced in English in United Nations, Materials 
on Jurisdictional Immunities ... , pp. 203-207. 
" The court declared: 
..... an act must be deemed to be a private act where the State acts 
through its agencies in the same way as a private individual can act. 
An act must be deemed to be a sovereign act where the State, on the 
basis of its sovereignty, performs an act of legislation or administra-
tion (makes a binding decision). Sovereign acts are those in respect 
of which equality between the parties is lacking and where the place 
of equality is taken by subordination of one party to the other." 
(United Nations, Materials .... p. 205.) 
r 
41 Documents of the thirty-fifth session 
based his claim for damages was not the collection of 
mail, but the operation of a motor vehicle by the defen-
dant and the latter's action as a road user. The plea of 
immunity was rejected. Thus, the court said, 
we must always look at the act itself which is performed by State 
~;gans and not at its motive or purpose. We must always investigate 
the act of the State from which the claim is derived. Whether an act is 
of a private or sovereign nature must always be deduced from the 
nature of the legal transaction, viz. the inherent nature of the action 
taken or of the legal relationship which arises." 
82. Without at this stage commenting on the general 
applicability of such a test or the criterion of the 
"nature of the act" as the basis for a distinction to be 
drawn between acts for which there is jurisdictional im-
munity of States and acts for which there is not, it is ap-
parent that the complexity of the different facets of an 
act, such as the operation of a motor vehicle, the collec-
tion of mail or the transport of diplomatic bags, could 
be viewed differently from different angles and stand-
points, with varying results and even diametrically 
opposite conclusions. 
2. JUDICIAL PRACTICE FOLLOWING ADOPTION 
OF RESTRICTIVE NATIONAL LEGISLATION 
83. Following the adoption of national legislation on 
State immunity in a number of countries in the past 
decade or so, it is now to be expected that the judicial 
practice in those countries will be guided by such legisla-
tion. As will be seen below (paras. 86-95), the case-law 
of several jurisdictions, such as the United States of 
America, the United Kingdom, Austria, Cyprus, 
Pakistan, Canada, Singapore and South Africa, which 
almost invariably had tended in the past to adhere to a 
more absolute doctrine of State immunity, might ap-
pear, since the introduction of more restrictive legisla-
tion on immunity, to follow the restrictive trend in this 
area. 
84. A case directly in point which deserves mention in 
this connection is the decision of the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia in Letelier 
v. Republic oj Chile (1980).93 In September 1976, 
former Chilean Ambassador and Foreign Minister 
Orlando Letelier and his associate Ronni Moffitt were 
killed in Washington, D.C., when the car in which they 
were travelling was destroyed by an explosive device. 
Two years later, their survivors and personal represen-
tatives brought a civil action against Chile, seeking com-
pensation for tortious injuries connected with the 
deaths." Plaintiffs alleged that the bomb which 
" Ibid. 
" United States of America, Federal Supplement, vol. 488 (1980), 
p. 665. See, on this question, the interesting articles by H. D. 
Collums, "The Letelier case: Foreign sovereign liability for acts 
of political assassination", Virginia Journal of International Law 
(Charlottesville, Va.), vol. 21 (1981), p. 251. 
.. The plaintiffs set forth five causes of action: (1) conspiracy to 
deprive decedents of their constitutional rights, in violation of section 
1985 of title 42 of the United States Code (1976); (2) assault and bat-
tery resulting in death; (3) negligent transportation and detonation of 
explosives; (4) assassination of decedents in violation of international 
law; (5) assault upon Letelier, an "internationally protected person" 
destroyed Letelier's car was detonated by certain in-
dividual defendants acting under the direction and with 
the aid of defendants the Republic of Chile, its in-
telligence service, Centro Nacional de Inteligencia 
(CNI), and certain individual CNI agents and officers.9l 
In a preliminary opinion, the court held that it had 
subject-matter jurisdiction96 and also ruled that the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act oj 1976,97 which per-
mits a foreign State to claim immunity for certain 
enumerated non-commercial torts and for acts based on 
"discretionary functions", does not provide a defence 
against liability where a foreign State has ordered its 
agents to conduct an assassination or other acts of 
political terrorism in the United States.9I In its judgment 
of 5 November 1980, the court awarded approximately 
SUS 4.9 million in pecuniary damages for the survivors 
and personal representatives of the victims." The de-
cisions in this case constitute a clear precedent for the 
award of pecuniary damages against a foreign State in 
connection with proven acts of political violence in the 
United States. Future determination of questions of 
State immunity will probably be made with reference to 
the terms of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act as 
the "sole and exclusive standards", and not on the basis 
of the more customary notions of "public acts" or acts 
jure imperii, such as those developed prior to 1976. 
Foreign States can no longer claim immunity on the 
grounds that assassinations or other acts of officially 
sanctioned violence against targets in the United States 
are public acts.IOO In other words, the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act does not purport to give foreign States 
licence or discretion to commit assassinations or other 
illegal acts in the United States. 101 
85. On the other hand, in other cases in which they 
might have applied the exception of non-commercial 
torts under section 1605, paragraph (a) (5), of the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the courts have 
declined to find jurisdiction. Thus jurisdiction was 
found to be lacking in Yessenin- Vo/pin v. Novosti Press 
Agency, Tass Agency and the Daily World (1978),102 
where a libel action was brought against two Soviet 
press services for defamation in connection with articles 
printed abroad but circulated in the United States. The 
pursuant to section 112 of title 18 of the United States Code (1976), 
which proximately resulted in this death and that of Moffitt (Federal 
Supplement, vol. 488, p. 666). 
" For the names of the defendants, ibid., pp. 665-666. For the 
criminal actions instituted at the same time: United States 
v. Sepulveda (1 August 1978), United States v. Sampol (2 April 1979 
and 23 March 1979), United States v. Diaz (2 April 1979), ibid., 
p. 666, footnote I. 
.. In accordance with sections 1330, 1332, para. (a), 1391, para. (J), 
1441, para. (d), and 1602-1611 of title 28 of the United States Code 
(1976). 
" Section 1605, para. (a) (5) (A) (see para. 87 below). 
.. Federal Supplement, vol. 488, p. 673. 
.. See Federal Supplement, vol. 502 (1981), p. 259 . 
I •• Concerning other cases of political assassination and acts of in-
ternational terrorism, see, for example, Time, vol. 116, No.5 
(4 August 1980), p. 36; and Newsweek, 19 May 1980, p. 38. 
,., See footnote 98 above. 
,.2 Federal Supplement, vol. 443 (1978), p. 849. 
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court found the Novosti press service to be an "agency 
or instrumentality" of the Soviet State entitled to im-
munity. I OJ An exception to immunity was not available 
because libel actions are specifically excluded from this 
area of general exception. ,04 Again, in Upton et 0/. 
v. Empire of Iran (1978), IDS the court declined to 
assume jurisdiction because the incident concerned, 
namely the collapse of the roof of a building at Tehran 
airport, belonging to the Iranian State, in 1974, occurred 
outside the United States. '06 In Carey v. Nationa/ Oil 
Corporation (1978),'07 the court declined jurisdiction on 
the grounds that the exception to immunity for tort ac-
tions does not apply to claims involving interference 
with contract rights. 101 The Letelier case was therefore 
the first of a kind, with a clean slate for application of 
the exception of "personal injuries and damage to 
property", resulting in "non-immunity" for an act of 
political assassination. The far-reaching implications of 
the decision in this case are still to be seen in the future 
practice of United States courts. '09 
3. GOVERNMENTAL PRACTICE 
(a) Nationa//egis/ation 
86. Since legal developments in the case-law of States 
are foreshadowed to a large extent by the adoption of 
recent national legislation on State immunity recogniz-
ing the general exception of "personal injuries and 
damage to property", it is necessary and desirable to 
examine the pertinent provisions of these statutory en-
actments. 
87. As has been clearly illustrated by the example of 
judicial decisions in the United States of America, the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976" 0 contains 
an interesting and sweeping provision, which reads: 
10, Ibid., p. 854 (citing section 1603, para. (b), of the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act). 
106 Ibid., p. 855. The court also held that the provisions of section 
1605, para. (a) (2), concerning "commercial activities" as an excep-
tion to immunity, did not apply because the activities in question were 
of a "public or governmental" and not a commercial nature. 
10, Federal Supplement, vol. 459 (1979), p. 264. 
10. The court observed that, even if there had been negligence on the 
part of the defendants, it had not caused a "direct" effect in the 
United States (ibid., pp. 265-266). Judgment affirmed on appeal in 
1979 (Federal Reporter, 2nd Series, vol. 607 (1980), p. 494). 
10' Federal Supplement, vol. 453 (1978), p. 1097 . 
... This case concerned an action brought by a New York corpora-
tion against the Libyan Government and the Libyan National Oil Cor-
poration. The New York corporation sought damages for the 
cancellation of supply contracts by the Libyan corporation during the 
1973-1974 Arab oil embargo, involving highly visible "political" acts 
by the Libyan State (ibid., pp. 1099·1\00). The judgment of the 
district court was affirmed on other grounds by the Court of Appeals 
of the Second Circuit in 1979 (per curiam) (Federal Reporter, 
2nd Series, vol. 592 (1979), p. 673). 
'0, See Collums, loc. cit. (see footnote 93 above), pp. 263·266. The 
five categories of strictly political or public acts as noted in Victory 
Transport Inc. v. Comisarfa General de Abastecimientos y 
Transportes (1964) (Federal Reporter, 2nd Series, vol. 336 (1965), 
p. 354, at p. 360; International Law Reports (London), vol. 35 (1967), 
p. 110) may be open to doubts. 
110 See footnote 66 above. 
- Section /605. General exceptions to the jurisdictional 
immunity of a foreign State 
(a) A foreign State shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of 
courts of the United States or of the States in any case: 
(5) not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above, III in which 
money damages are sought against a foreign State for personal 
injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in 
the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of 
that foreign State or of any official or employee of that foreign 
State-while acting within the scope of his office or employment; 
except this paragraph shall not apply to: 
(A) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the 
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function 
regardless of whether the discretion be abused, or 
(8) any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of 
process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference 
with contract rights. 
88. The United Kingdom State Immunity Act 1978" 2 
contains a shorter and less detailed provision. Section 5 
of the Act provides: 
Exceptions from immunity 
5. A State is not immune as respects proceedings in respect of: 
(a) death or personal injury; or 
(b) damage to or loss of tangible property, caused by an act or 
omission in the United Kingdom. 
89. A closely similar if not identical provision can be 
found in the more recent legislation of several common-
law or Commonwealth countries in Asia, southern 
Africa and North America, in particular in section 7 of 
Singapore's State Immunity Act, 1979,'IJ in section 6 of 
the Foreign States Immunities Act, 1981 of South 
Africa" 4 and in section 6 of Canada's State Immunity 
Act of 1982.'15 It is interesting to observe that the Can-
adian Act follows closely the wording of the United 
Kingdom Act in this connection, while in regard to 
"contracts of employment" it has not chosen to adopt 
the United Kingdom solution. On the other hand, 
Pakistan's State Immunity Ordinance, 1981" 6 does not 
include "death, personal injury and damage to prop-
erty" as a general exception to State immunity. Since 
the common-law practice, especially that of the United 
Kingdom, had been considered to favour a most un-
qualified principle of State immunity, this relatively 
sudden change of heart is causing extensive reflection in 
the legislation and judicial practice of other common-
law jurisdictions the world over. 
II. "(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity car· 
ried on in the United States by the foreign State; or upon an act per· 
formed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity 
of the foreign State elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of 
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the 
foreign State elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United 
States;" 
112 See footnote 65 above. 
"' See footnote 68 above. 
." See footnote 70 above. The expression "tangible property" is 
also used. 
." See footnote 67 above. 
.11 See footnote 69 above. 
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90. It should be further noted that national legislation 
dealing with State immunity invariably touches upon 
the question of scope and extent of subject-matter 
jurisdiction. Thus, while the United Kingdom Act of 
1978 bases jurisdiction on the locus delicti commissi, its 
counterparts in other common-law jurisdictions contain 
more than slight variations. Singapore's Act of 1979 
and South Africa's Act of 1981 appear to follow this 
principle, with reference to the place of occurrence of 
the act or omission being in the territory of the State of 
the forum. The Canadian Act, on the other hand, bases 
jurisdiction on the place of occurrence of loss of life or 
property, or damage to person and property, being in 
Canada. The United States legislation, more akin to the 
Canadian, seems to place greater emphasis on the occur-
rence of the "personal injury or death, or damage to or 
loss of property" in the United States, caused by an act 
or omission of a "foreign State or of any official or 
employee of that foreign State while acting within the 
scope of his office or employment". The United States 
legislation in a way defines the attribution of liability to 
the foreign State for the act or omission of its official or 
employee. This general exception is, in turn, subject to 
many exceptions with regard to the causes of action, 
which in other jurisdictions would appear unlikely to 
derive from physical damage to person or property or 
the loss of life or property. The end results would ap-
pear to be broadly similar, if not the same, as it is dif-
ficult to imagine the possibility of physical injury to per-
son or property caused by an act or omission other than 
intentional, negligent or accidental. The area under con-
sideration covers physical damage to the person which 
may cause death or disability or other bodily harm, and 
physical damage to tangible property or corporeal 
hereditament as opposed to intangible rights, and in-
deed total loss or destruction of such tangible property. 
By definition, this area excludes defamation-libel and 
slander-but probably includes stricter liability at-
tributable to occupiers of premises, holders of 
dangerous chattels and keepers of animals, at least in 
respect of physical injuries or damage to property 
resulting from breach of a strict duty of care. 
91. While the current practice of States which have 
adopted legislation restricting immunity in this specified 
area is stilI in its infancy and awaiting further 
developments, it is to be assumed that other States 
which have ratified an international convention contain-
ing a similar restriction will also be bound to adopt a 
restrictive practice in this area. Thus Austria, Belgium 
and Cyprus may be presumed to have opted for limita-
tion of State immunity in this particular area. 1 J7 
(b) International conventions 
(i) 1972 European Convention on State Immunity 
92. The 1972 European Convention on State Immun-
ity,1 II which came into force on 11 June 1976 in ac-
cordance with article 36, paragraph 2, between 
", States having ratified the 1972 European Convention on State 
Immunity (see footnotes 73 to 75 above). 
III See footnote 39 above. 
Austria, Belgium and Cyprus, contains the following 
provision: 
Article JJ 
A Contracting State cannot claim immunity from the jurisdiction of 
a court of another Contracting State in proceedings which relate to 
redress for injury to the person or damage to tangible property, if the 
facts which occasioned the injury or damage occurred in the territory 
of the State of the forum. and if the author of the injury or damage 
was 'present in thllt territory at the time when those facts occurred. 
93. This provision also serves to identify or delimit the 
scope of the causes of action, which are confined to 
physical damage to person or tangible property, with 
the locus delicti commissi being within the territory of 
the State of the forum. Territorial jurisdiction with 
respect to the occurrence of the facts which occasioned 
the injury or damage is reinforced by a further ter-
ritorial requirement that the author of the act or omis-
sion, be it an official or employee of a foreign State to 
which liability is attributable, must have been physically 
present in the territory at the time those facts occurred. 
This double requirement ensures the solid grounds on 
which the State of the forum may found universally 
recognized jurisdiction and exercise it even in pro-
ceedings involving a foreign State. 
(ii) Inter-American Draft Convention on Jurisdictional 
Immunity of States 
94. While the fullest implications of article 11 of the 
1972 European Convention have not yet been assessed 
in relation to the practice of States which have ratified 
and applied it, national legislation already abounds in 
States sympathetic to a restrictive principle in this area. 
The recent Inter-American Draft Convention on 
Jurisdictional Immunity of States (1983)119 may be cited 
as an example of regional efforts in pursuit of this 
restrictive trend. The draft provides: 
Article 6 
States shall not claim immunity from jurisdiction ... : 
(e) In proceedings for losses and damages or tort liabilities arising 
from the activities mentioned in article 5. paragraph one; 
95. The first paragraph of article 5 of the inter-
American draft convention provides: "States shall not 
invoke immunity against claims relative to trade or com-
mercial activities undertaken in the State of the forum." 
This provision also bases subject-matter jurisdiction on 
the place of occurrence of losses and damage being 
within the forum State. It further confines grounds for 
action to tort liabilities arising from trade or commer-
cial activities undertaken by the foreign State within the 
territory of the State of the forum. In some more or less 
precise way, the locus delicti commissi appears to afford 
an internationally accepted criterion for the assumption 
of jurisdiction and a sound basis for its exercise, if ever 
a general exception to State immunity is to become 
universally recognized in future State practice. 
'" See footnote 77 above. 
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4. INTERNATIONAL OPINION 
96. While it is still too early to monitor opinions of 
writers with regard to this particular area of "personal 
injuries and damage to property" as an exception to 
State immunity, there appears to be a growing sympathy 
in the thinking of contemporary authors, who are in-
variably supporters of a restrictive trend. In this as well 
as in other specified areas where there have been 
legislative enactments and regional conventions restrict-
ing State immunity, writers can readily find justification 
for such restriction. If a State so chooses, it could enact 
a law governing immunities of foreign States which 
would enumerate those acts requiring acceptance of the 
local jurisdiction. 12O There appears to be danger that 
legal developments may not follow the same or a similar 
pattern if States are encouraged to adopt their own na-
tional legislation without regard for evolving interna-
tional standards. Even regional conventions applicable 
exclusively among the contracting States could generate 
restrictive principles for third States, once participating 
countries proceed to implement their regional treaty 
obligations by enacting national legislation which would 
in any event be applicable to foreign States alike in 
regard to the exercise of territorial jurisdiction or 
subject-matter jurisdiction, closely linked to the ter-
ritory of the forum State or with substantial contacts 
with the territorial State. 
97. This restrictive trend finds unmistaken expression 
in the draft articles for a convention on State immunity 
prepared at the 1982 conference of the International 
Law Association,121 which groups international lawyers 
from all walks of life and from the various legal systems 
the world over. It is the collective support for a restric-
tive trend in this particular area that deserves mindful 
attention. Thus the draft provides: 
Article /11. Exceptions to immunity from adjudication 
A foreign State shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the 
forum State to adjudicate in the following instances inter alia: 
F. Where the cause of action relates to: 
I. Death or personal injury; or 
2. Damage to or loss of property. 
Subsections I and 2 shall not apply unless the act or omission 
which caused the death, injury or damage occurred wholly or 
partly in the forum State. 
98. Subject-matter jurisdiction is therefore un-
mistakably tied to the locus delicti commissi. This provi-
sion is not necessarily intended to regulate questions of 
conflict of laws or of jurisdictions in private interna-
tional law, but rather to suggest a sound foundation in 
public 'internationallaw and an acceptable international 
standard for the exercise of territorial jurisdiction by the 
12. See, for example, the authors cited above: Mann (footnote 79), 
Brownlie (footnote 80) and Sinclair (ibid.). 
'" See footnote 81 above. 
State of the forum in proceedings against foreign States 
in this specified area. 
s. AN EMERGING TREND 
99. In the light of the growing opinion of writers and 
the increasing practice of States favouring the exercise 
of jurisdiction, where there is sound ~ubject-matter 
jurisdiction, in proceedings against foreign States for 
personal "injuries and damage to property, an emerging 
trend is becoming more readily discernible in favour 
of relief being granted to individuals for the personal 
injury suffered or for the loss of or damage to their 
property. The problem confronting the international 
community is not so much whether or not to limit or 
restrict the application of State immunity, but rather 
how to allow the exercise of territorial jurisdiction in a 
generally accepted area. The emerging trend could lead 
to confusion and disorder if the international commu-
nity fails to intervene at this stage by giving whatever 
advice and guidance may be needed to harmonize and 
reorient the emerging trend towards to healthier direc-
tion and achieve more salutary results for all concerned, 
the foreign sovereign States as well as the aggrieved in-
dividuals. 
C. Formulation of draft article 14 
100. In an endeavour to formulate a draft article con-
taining this general exception, adequate expression 
should be given to the emerging trend in international 
legal opinion reflecting the mounting practice of 
States-judicial and legislative as well as governmental. 
Some basic elements appear to require precise specifica-
tion. The area under review unequivocally covers "per-
sonal injury", including loss of life or physical injury to 
the person, as well as "damage to property", including 
loss or total destruction of tangible property. It is clear 
from the type of physical damage inflicted upon the per-
son or property that the causes of action could arise 
from any activities undertaken by a foreign State or one 
of its organs, agencies or instrumentalities within the 
State of the forum. It is equally clear that the infliction 
of personal injury or physical damage to property could 
be intentional or accidental or the result of negligent or 
reckless conduct, for which the foreign State is liable, 
either in tort as is commonly understood in common-
law jurisdictions, such as for assault, battery, negligence 
or a traffic accident, or in any other type of civil action 
for personal injury or damage to property. Damage to 
reputation or defamation is not personal injury in the 
physical sense, nor can interference with contract rights 
or any rights, including economic or social rights, be 
viewed as damage to tangible property. Of course, the 
territorial connection should also be expressly men-
tioned so as not to confer extraterritorial jurisdiction 
or otherwise un-overreachable subject-matter jurisdic-
tion on the State of the forum simply to provide a 
remedy for redressing personal injury or damage to pro-
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101. Article 14 might read as follows: 
Article U. Personal injuries and damage to property 
Unless otherwise agreed, a State is not immune from 
the Jurisdiction of the courts of another State in respect 
of proceedings relating to injury to the person or death 
or damage to or loss of tangible property. if the act or 
omission which caused the injury or damage in the State 
of tbe forum occurred in that territory. and tbe autbor 
of tbe injury or damage was present tberein at tbe time 
of its occurrence. 
ARTICLE IS (Ownership. possession and use of property) 
A. General considerations 
1. SCOPE OF "OWNERSHIP, POSSESSION AND USE OF PROp· 
ERTY" AS AN EXCEPTION TO STATE IMMUNITY 
102, As has been seen in connection with part II, 
"General principles", under article 7, paragraph 3, 
"a proceeding before a court of a State shall be con-
sidered to have been instituted against another State 
... when the proceeding is designed to deprive that 
other State of its property or of the use of property in its 
possession or control" .122 State immunity could thus be 
invoked even though the proceeding is not brought 
directly against a foreign State but is merely aimed 
at depriving that State of its property or of the use of 
property in its possession or controL Without, at this 
stage, touching on the question of State immunity in 
respect of attachment and execution of its property, it 
will suffice to recall that a State is immune when a pro-
ceedipg affects its ownership of property, or when the 
use of property in its possession or control is thereby af-
fected. 
103. Jurisdictional immunity of a State in respect of 
its ownership or use of property in its possession or con-
trol is recognized as a general principle. It is the purpose 
of the present draft article to define and delineate the 
scope of its application. Admittedly, as a general rule, a 
proceeding seeking to deprive a foreign State of its 
property or the use of property in its possession or con-
trol will be disallowed on application of the principle of 
State immunity. There are, however, various categories 
of circumstances or cases in which a proceeding will be 
permitted even though it may involve ownership of 
property contested by a foreign State or the use of prop-
erty in the possession or control of that State. 
104. In the first place, a proceeding may be brought 
which relates to the property of a foreign State or to the 
use of property in its possession or control situated in 
the territory of the State of the forum if it does not seek 
to deprive the foreign State of its ownership of that 
property or of its use but merely, for instance, to have 
the transfer of title deeds properly registered or to estab-
• 12 See footnote 12 above. 
lish the existence or compel registration of easements or 
mortgage or other charges connected with the property. 
105. In order to invoke State immunity in a pro-
ceeding relating to ownership of its property or the use 
of property in its possession or control, the State may 
have to assert its claim of interest, which could cover 
either ownership of the right to use the property, or its 
actual possession or effective control. Mere assertion 
will nowadays not suffice to establish jurisdictional im-
munity in such a case, unless ownership by the State or 
its right to use is admitted by the parties to the litigation, 
or unless the State can provide prima facie evidence of 
title or proof of its claims of interest. Unless and until 
such claims of interest are established, the court may ex-
ercise jurisdiction; but once ownership by the State is 
established or its right to use the property is proven, 
then the general principle of State immunity comes into 
play and the proceeding may only be resumed if it still 
falls within one of the exceptions in part III. With 
regard to property, there is a clear exception to be em-
bodied in draft article 15. The scope and application of 
this important, time-honoured exception will become 
more apparent upon closer study and analysis of certain 
essential questions. 
2. PREDOMINANT AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF 
THE SITUS A DECISIVE FACTOR 
106. An important aspect of the principle par in parem 
imperium non habet is reflected in the proposition that 
an extraterritorial authority cannot be vested with the 
power to exercise imperium within the territorium of 
another sovereign State, unless of course the territorial 
sovereign expressly consents to such exercise, which will 
have to be very limited in time as well as in scope. An 
unlimited concession of the exercise of extraterritorial 
sovereign authority would have a destructive effect 
upon the very existence of territorial sovereignty. The 
generally recognized sovereign authority over persons 
and things situated or present within the territory of a 
State must therefore be vested in the territorial State 
itself. Thus the authority of the territorial State to ad-
minister or to legislate or decide disputes relating to per-
sons or property within the confines of its territory can 
be challenged by no other State. No one may contest the 
exercise of territorial jurisdiction over persons and 
property within the recognized framework and consist-
ently with other principles of international law, such as 
the treatment of aliens, the principle of non-discrimina-
tion or human rights. 
107. As far as property is concerned, especially im-
movable property, the State of the situs exercises 
supreme authority as part and parcel of its sovereignty. 
Indeed, the concept of ownership and other proprietary 
rights or interests can only exist within the framework 
of the legal system of the situs, and such a concept is 
bound to be inherently absorbed within the notion of 
territorial sovereignty of the State of the situs itself. 
This appears to constitute a sound proposition of inter-
national law, as the inductive approach adopted in the 
present study will later reveal (paras. 116-137 below) . 
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I v~reign authority over its nationals and its officials, 
SO encies or instrumentalities in the conduct of their ac-
~~ities abroad or in the territory of another State, such 
dontrol or authority based on the national character or 
ersonal nature is eminently absent in so far as property 
~ituated outside its territorial boundary is concerned, 
especially if the property in question, whether movable 
or immovable, is situated within the territory of another 
State. A State has the authority to require its nationals 
to pay taxes or to perform traditional national services, 
but it cannot hope to extend similar authority, whether 
legislative, administrative or even judicial, over prop-
erty situated outside its territorial authority; much less if 
the property is situated in the territory of another 
sovereign authority; far less also if it is an immovable 
property, subject to the lex situs and the territorial 
sovereignty of the local sovereign authority. The 
predominant authority of the State of the situs is a 
decisive factor in determining the question of available 
jurisdiction. 
3. PRIORITY OF THE LEX SITUS A DETERMINATIVE ELEMENT 
109. If the authority of the State of the situs should 
prevail in any event or in most cases where there appears 
to be overlapping or concurrence, if not conflict, of 
jurisdictions, there seems to be an added reason for the 
predominance or primacy of the territorial authority. 
The applicable law is unmistakably the lex situs as no 
other law can be more proper than the law of the place 
where the property itself is situated. A fortiori the 
regime or legal relationship with regard to land or im-
movable property, with its peculiar history, niceties and 
complexities, has developed in response to the needs of 
the territorial society, its traditions, usages and 
customs. Every system of land law or law concerning 
immovable property is unique in itself. Its exclusive ap-
plicability cannot be disputed, since ownership and 
other proprietary rights or interests in property do not 
and cannot exist except within the framework and pur-
view of the lex situs. The supremacy of the lex situs and 
its sole authority in regard to property have rendered the 
assumption and exercise of territorial jurisdiction by the 
forum rei sitae all the more inevitable; in the absence of 
any alternative or competitive system of law, neither the 
lex patriae nor the lex fori of an extraterritorial auth-
ority could qualify to replace or supplant either the 
jurisdiction of the forum rei sitae or the exclusive ap-
plicability of the lex situs. 
110. Faced with the decisive priority of the territorial 
jurisdiction and the exclusive application of its internal 
law governing legal relations with regard to property, 
especially immovable and to a large extent also movable 
property, a kind of exception has long been recognized 
and admitted in the practice of States. A State is not im-
mune from the jurisdiction of the courts of another 
State in respect of proceedings relating to a series of 
classes or categories of cases involving the application 
of the internal law of the State of the situs. In any event, 
the forum rei sitae is a most convenient court competent 
to apply the internal law of the State of the situs. The 
rights and interests of the foreign State or the extrater-
ritorial State with regard to property situated within the 
territory of the State of the situs can only be recognized 
under the internal law of the territorial State. When it 
comes to the authority of the internal law and a foreign 
State may derive rights and interests only by virtue of 
the application of the internal law of the situs and with 
the aid and assistance of the judicial authority of the 
situs, then the only sensible solution is to recognize the 
determinative authotity or the deciding power of the ter-
ritorial State. The extraterritorial State may be said to 
have waived immunity or to have itself invoked the 
jurisdiction of the territorial State when questions of 
property rights within the State of the situs have to be 
determined by the judicial authority or the local 
sovereign and with its internal law, the lex situs, being 
the only applicable law. 
111. An alternative solution or sheer insistence on the 
principle of State immunity would only lead to chaos 
and absurdity. There would be a legal vacuum, as the 
rights and interests of the extraterritorial authority itself 
would be without legal foundation, failing its own 
recognition of and respect for the internal law of the ter-
ritorial State. In fact, this is an accurate and orderly ap-
plication of the maxim par in parem jurisdictionem non 
habet. It is the extraterritorial State that has no author-
ity to introduce a new legal system within the territorial 
framework of another sovereign State. It follows that 
the only internal law that prevails in the circumstances is 
that of the State of the situs. If need be, such an excep-
tional situation could be viewed from the standpoint of 
the outside State or extraterritorial authority as an ex-
ception to its otherwise available jurisdictional im-
munity. 
4. POSSIBILITY OF ACQUISITION OF PROPRIETARY RIGHTS 
BY A FOREIGN STATE UNDER THE INTERNAL LAW OF THE 
STATE OF THE SITUS 
112. If a State acquires property in the form of owner-
ship or other proprietary rights and the property, 
whether immovable or movable, is situated in the ter-
ritory of another State, the acquisition of such property 
is made possible only by virtue of the application of the 
internal law or private law of the State of the situs. The 
outside State or extraterritorial State as an outsider 
must, from the start, fully recognize and respect the 
local or territorial internal law which unquestionably 
governs the legal relationship between the foreign State 
and the property so acquired. To disobey the rules of 
the internal law of the situs is to forfeit, abandon or 
relinquish legal rights to property under the prevailing 
system. This is particularly true of immovable property 
which cannot change its location, while movable prop-
erty could be transported out of the territory of its 
former situs and be subjected to a different system of in-
ternal law. Whatever the case, internal law of the situs 
governs the questions of acquisition and loss of prop-
erty, including title and other proprietary rights. 
113. Under the internal law of the situs, there may be 
several methods of acquiring property, such as by sale 
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or purchase, by usucapio longi temporis Or prescription, 
by testate or intestate succession, or by devolution or 
transfer as bona vacantia. Thus it is pre-eminently by 
virtue of the internal law of the situs that questions of 
title, ownership and other proprietary rights are to be 
determined. 
114. It is also the judicial authority of the situs that 
appears to be omnicompetent to apply the lex situs, and 
it is by the grace and authority of the forum rei sitae that 
questions or disputes relating to titles, ownership or ac-
quisition of property are adjudicated. In proceedings 
concerning the ascertainment of ownership or other 
rights to property, such as trust funds, real estate or 
bank accounts, parties interested in the determination 
of their rights or their portio legitima do come to court 
of their own free will. There is no element of compul-
sion or, to use an old English term, "no impleading of a 
foreign sovereign against his will". If the foreign State 
intervenes or interpleads, it does so on a voluntary 
basis, for such proceedings are often not against any 
party, but merely to determine the nature and extent of 
the legal interests of all the parties concerned. If the 
foreign State chooses to seek the judicial determination 
of its rights and titles under the internal law of the situs, 
it is free to do so or to be represented before the court of 
competence. If, however, the foreign State does not feel 
so inclined or obliged, it may decline at the risk of 
forfeiting its rightful title or property. 
115. With regard to movable property, there may be 
different types of property that can enter and leave the 
territory of another State. It is no longer enough that 
the foreign State merely asserts °its title; it may be re-
quired to give evidence to prove title or to establish 0 its 
ownership or possession or the right to use. This is all 
the more significant if the property in question is a 
seagoing vessel, an aircraft, a hovercraft or a spaceship, 
or indeed a communications satellite or a space lab-
oratory. While there are special regimes of public inter-
national law regulating many of the questions involved, 
such as the responsibility of the launching State for 
damage caused and the obligation to return the space 
object,123 the more mundane and fundamental ques-
tions of title, rights and interests in property under the 
internal law remain to be adjudged, in each instance, by 
the court of recognized competence which, in most 
cases, even for movable property, still happens to be the 
forum rei sitae, namely the court of the State in whose 
territory the property is situated or to be found at the 
time of the proceedings. 
B. The practice of States 
1. JUDICIAL PRACTICE 
116. The judicial practice of States in this area of 
"ownership, possession and use of property" as an ex-
ception to State immunity is not unknown. If there is an 
area which is less grey as an exception to State immun-
'" See Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused 
by Space Objects (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 961, p. 187). 
ity, it is this one. For reasons that are apparent from the 
general considerations above, State practice seems to 
bear out the absence of immunity for proceedings in-
volving determination of ownership of property and its 
acquisition or title under the internal law of the State of 
the situs by the territorial court. 
117. A decision by the District Court of Tokyo in Lim-
bin Hteik Tin Lat v. Union of Burma (1954)124 is a case 
dir~tly in point. The proceedings related to a dispute as 
to title to a piece of land in Tokyo. The court ruled that 
Japan had jurisdiction and that the court had com-
petence over the proceedings, in which the respondent 
was a foreign State. The court declared: 
A State is not subject to the exercise of power by another State, and 
therefore is not subject to the jurisdiction of another State in the mat-
ter of civil proceedings. This is to be admitted as a principle of interna-
tionallaw recognized in general. ... However ... in an action concern-
. ing immovables, it is widely admitted that jurisdiction belongs ex-
clusively to the State of the situs, and consequently it must be said that 
a foreign State may be subject to the jurisdiction of another State.'" 
118. The case-law of the United Kingdom has been ac-
curately summarized by Lord Denning, Master of the 
Rolls, in Thai-Europe Tapioca Service Ltd. v. Govern-
ment of Pakistan, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 
Directorate of Agricultural Supplies (1975),126 in his 
judgment confirming a restrictive view he had earlier 
proposed in Rahimtoola v. Ni1.am of Hyderabad 
(1957).125 Accepting the general principle that "except 
by consent, the courts of this country will not issue their 
process so as to entertain a claim against a foreign 
sovereign for debt or damages", Lord Denning then 
outlined four existing exceptions in English case-law: 
First, (there isl no immunity in respect of land situate in 
England ... . 
Second ... in respect of trust funds here or money lodged for the 
payment of creditors .... 
Third ... in respect of debts incurred here for services rendered to ... 
property here .... 
Fourth, (when) a foreign sovereign ... enters into a commercial 
transaction with a trader here and a dispute ari~es which is properly 
within the territorial jurisdiction of (English) courts. '" 
119. Lord Denning's dicta and observations have been 
found to have compelling reasons even outside the 
". International Law Reports (London), vol. 32 (1966), p. 124; text 
reproduced in United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictional Im-
munities ... , pp. 339-340. 
'" The court added: 
..... an immovable is an object par excellence of territorial 
sovereignty of the State of its situs and this fact has been regarded 
as worthy of respect as a matter of international comity; hence it 
has come to be recognized for a long time that an action directly 
concerning immovables comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the State of the situs. It has to be admitted, therefore, that ... this 
principle has been recognized as applicable in actions in which a 
foreign State is a party, as well as where a private person is a 
party. " 
... The All England Law Reports, 1975, vol. 3, p. 961. 
'" United Kingdom, The Law Reports, House of Lords, 1958, 
p.379. 
m Loc. cit. (footnote 126 above), pp. 965-966. See also the judg-
ment of the Supreme Court of Ontario in Harold W. M. Smith 
v. United States Securities and Exchange Commission (1976) (Interna-
tional Legal Materials (Washington, D.C.), vol. XV, No.2 (1976), 
p. 319). 
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vnited Kingdom. 129 With regard to the exception of 
trading or comme~cial activities considered earlier, the 
position was reaffirmed by the House of Lords in the 
"ICongreso del Partido "case (1981).130 The first three 
exceptions fall within the specified area of the present 
draft article, viz. immovable and movable property, in-
cluding trust funds. 
120. The doctrine of "trust" as conceived by the 
Chancery and other courts of equitable jurisdiction has 
long been recognized in English practice as an exception 
to immunity. Actions may proceed in spite of the fact 
that a foreign Government may have an interest in the 
trust fund. In Duke oj Brunswick v. King oj Hanover 
(1844),131 Lord Langdale, Master of the Rolls, con-
sidered it possible to make a foreign sovereign a party to 
administration proceedings, since doing so did not 
"compel" him to take part in them, it merely gave him 
"an opportunity to come in to ... establish his interest" . 
Similarly it was said by Justice Maugham in the Russian 
Bank jor Foreign Trade case (1933)132 that the fact that 
the proceedings related to funds in which the Soviet 
Government had an interest could not prevent the 
Chancery Division from performing its duty. 
121. This notion of trust has also provided the 
Chancery courts with a new basis for exercising jurisdic-
tion in actions against third parties in respect of State-
owned property in their hands, whenever it is possible to 
regard the property as trust funds in the custody of the 
trustees. This was actually decided by Lord Hatherley in 
Lariviere v. Morgan (1872),133 concerning the supply of 
cartridges to the French Government during the Franco-
Prussian war. Morgan opened a bank account in 
England on behalf of the French Government for settle-
ment of the latter's contractual obligations. The Court 
of Appeal denied immunity, treating the bank account 
as trust property and the action as one against Morgan, 
not as a foreign State agent, but as a trustee. The House 
of Lords appears to have approved of this doctrine of 
trust. I H The same principle has been applied in subse-
quent cases. III 
J2t See, for example, Justice Owen in the Court of Appeal of 
Quebec in Venne v. Democratic Republic of the Congo (1969) 
(Canada, The Dominion Law Reports, Third Series (Toronto), vo\. 5 
(1969), p. 128). 
'" See footnote 30 above. 
'" House of Lords Cases (London), vo\. II (1848-1850) (1851), p. 1; 
see also Lord Radcliffe in the "gold bars" case, United States of 
America and Republic of France v. Dollfus Mieg et Cie S.A. and Bank 
of England (1952) (The All England Law Reports, 1952, vo\. 1, 
p. 572, at p. 589). 
'" United Kingdom, The Law Reports, Chancery Division, 1933, 
p. 745. The court assumed jurisdiction despite the fact that the Soviet 
Government might possibly intervene to establish a claim to some part 
of the assets. 
II. United. Kingdom, The Law Reports, Chancery Appeal Cases, 
vo\. VII (1872), p. 550. 
," Morgan v. Lariviere (1875) (The Law Reports, English and Irish 
Appeal Cases, vo\. VII (1875), p. 423). 
II. See, for example, Haile Selassie v. Cable and Wireless Limited 
(1937) (The Law Reports, Chancery Division, 1938, p. 545), on appeal 
(1938) (ibid., p. 839); Nizam of Hyderabad and another v. Jung and 
others (1956) (The All England Law Reports, 1957, vol. 1, p. 257); 
and Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad (1957) (/oc. cit. (footnote 
127 above), pp. 392-398 (Viscount Simonds». 
122. Reference to English case-law recognizing the ex-
~ept.ion under consideration is not without significance 
10 View of the traditional association of English judicial 
practice with an almost unqualified principle of 
sovereign immunity. It is not surprising that a similar 
exception is recognized in other case-laws, such as in 
Italy, where the jurisprudence distinguishes between the 
State as potere politico and as persona civile. Thus, as 
early as 1882, the dual personality of the State was 
recognized in Morellet v. Governo Danese, 136 where the 
Court of Cassation of Turin distinguished between the 
State as a political entity and as a corpo morale and 
observed that, in the latter capacity, the State must "ac-
quire and own property, it must contract, it must sue 
and be sued, and in a word, it must exercise civil rights 
in like manner as any other juristic person or private in-
dividual (un altro corpo morale 0 privato individuo 
qualunque)" .1l1 
123. The case-law of the States applying a restrictive 
principle of State immunity invariably allows actions to 
proceed which may involve titles or interests of a foreign 
Government or transactions concerning immovable 
property situated in the territory of the State of the 
forum. III 
2. GOVERNMENTAL PRACTICE 
124. Judicial practice in this particular area appears to 
be more settled and consistent in support of an 
established exception to State immunity, although there 
is no prototype judicial decision on every point at issue 
in every existing case-law. It would be neither desirable 
nor practical to expect that every judicial system must 
have litigation on any given point. The practice of States 
in this connection amply supplements judicial practice 
in a number of ways, notably by way of replies to the 
Secretariat's questionnaire and by adoption of specific 
national legislation on the precise point under con-
sideration. 
(a) Views oj Governments 
125. In the replies to the questionnaire, 139 it is possible 
to gather interesting evidence of governmental opinion 
II. Loc. cit. (footnote 33 above), pp. 130-13\. 
'" Idem; cited in Harvard Law School, Research in International 
Law, part III, "Competence of Courts in regard to Foreign States" 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1932), published as Supplement to The American 
Journal of International Law (Washington, D.C.), vol. 26 (1932), 
pp. 481-482. 
"' See, for example, S.E. Echref Badnjevic es qualite de Ministre de 
Yougoslavie en Egyptev. W. R. Fanner (1947) (Journal du droit inter-
national (Clunet) (Paris), vols. 73-76 (1946-1949), p. 113), where the 
Mixed Court of Cairo denied immunity for the purchase of an im-
movable property by a foreign legation to be used as a hOtel 
diplomatique. Cf. the Republic of Latvia case (l95S) (International 
Law Reports, 1955 (London), vol. 22 (1958), p. 230), where the Court 
of Appeal of West Berlin confirmed the decision of the Restitution 
Chamber (1953) on the grounds that "that principle does not apply if 
the foreign State enters into property relations with other States or 
their citizens, and acts not as the holder of sovereign powers but ex-
clusively as the holder of private rights and liabilities in the field of 
private law, being active in the field of civil-law and especially 
commercial-law transactions." 
'" See footnote 29 above. 
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and practice in support of the exception under review. 
Thus, in Hungary, a socialist country, State immunity is 
regulated by item (a) of section S6 of Law Decree 
No. 13 of 1979, under which a foreign State is exempt 
from the jurisdiction of a court or other public author· 
ity of the Hungarian State.··o The landed property of a 
foreign State in Hungary, however, belongs to the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of a Hungarian court of law or other 
public authority.··· 
126. Madagascar adopted the same restrictive view. 
Under article 29 of Ordinance No. 62-041 of 
19 September 1962: 
"Property is governed by the law of the place where it is situated. 
"In particular, immovable property situated in Madagascar, even 
when foreign-owned, is governed by Malagasy law." 
Under this provision, if movable or immovable property is situated 
'in Madagascar, the foreign State's title to that property or other pro-
perty rights are governed by Malagasy law. 
As to testate succession: 
If the property is immovable, it is governed by the law applicable 
where it is situated; 
If the property is movable, it is governed by the law applicable 
where the deceased was domiciled (art. 31 of Ordinance No. 62-041 of 
19 September 1962).'42 
127. Similar views were expressed by other Govern-
ments in their replies to the questionnaire, including 
Togo, Portugal and Trinidad and Tobago. Thus, in the 
view of Togo: 
If a foreign State owns or succeeds to an immovable or movable 
property situated in Togo, that State is subject to the regime of proof 
established by Togolese law for determining title to property. 
However, if the immovable or movable property is for diplomatic or 
similar uses, it enjoys extraterritoriality and immunity from 
distraint. ,., 
128. Giving a list of exceptions to State immunity, the 
Portuguese reply contained the following: 
Relying on what might be described as a universally accepted doc-
trine, the Portuguese courts agree that such immunity ceases only if: 
The proceedings relate to immovable property; 
There is an express or tacit waiver of immunity; 
The forum hereditatis exception is allowed. , .. 
129. The views expressed by Trinidad and Tobago are 
equally revealing: 
The exceptions or limitations provided by the common law of 
Trinidad and Tobago and those recognized by governmental practice 
in Trinidad and Tobago with respect to jurisdictional immunities of 
foreign States and their property relate to: 
(i) Actions relating to land within the jurisdiction (e.g. actions to 
recover rent from mortgage interest); 
(ii) Actions by a local beneficiary relating to a trust fund within the 
jurisdiction. '" 
, •• Text reproduced in United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictional 
Immunities ... , p. 17. 
,., See the reply of Hungary to question I, ibid., p. S7S. 
'42 Reply of Madagascar to question 14, ibid., p. S83. 
,., Reply of Togo to question 14, ibid., p. 609. 
, •• Reply of Portugal to question 3, ibid., p. S92. 
... Reply of Trinidad and Tobago to question 11, ibid., p. 612. 
(b) Nationa//egis/ation 
130. An increasing amount of national legislation has 
been adopted in the past 10 years or so, recognizing or 
confirming the existence of an exception in regard to 
property situated in the State of the forum. These provi-
sions are far from identical and do not always deal with 
the same subject·matter. 
131. Thus, in the· United States Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act of 1976, •• , there are two unrelated provi-
sions concerning property: 
Section 1605. General exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity 
of a foreign State 
(a) A foreign State shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of 
courts of the United States ... in any case: 
(3) in which rights in property taken in violation of international 
law are in issue and that property or any property exchanged for 
such property is present in the United States in connection with 
a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the 
foreign State; or that property or any property exchanged for 
such property is owned or operated by an agency or instrumen-
tality of the foreign State and that agency or instrumentality is 
engaged in a commercial activity in the United States; 
(4) in which rights in property in the United States acquired by suc-
cession or gift or rights in immovable property situated in the 
United States are in issue; 
132. The United Kingdom State Immunity Act 1978U7 
contains a provision analogous to that cited above, but 
which is more detailed. Section 6 of the Act reads: 
Exceptions from immunity 
6. (I) A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to: 
(a) any interest of the State in, or its possession or use of, im-
movable property in the United Kingdom; or 
(b) any obligation of the State arising out of its interest in, or its 
possession or use of, any such property. 
(2) A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to any 
interest of the State in movable or immovable property, being an in-
terest arising by way of succession, gift or bona vacantia. 
(3) The fact that a State has or claims an interest in any property 
shall not preclude any court from exercising in respect of it any 
jurisdiction relating to the estates of deceased persons or persons of 
unsound mind or to insolvency, the winding up of companies or the 
administration of trusts. 
(4) A court may entertain proceedings against a person other than a 
State notwithstanding that the proceedings relate to property: 
(a) which is in the possession or control of a State; or 
(b) in which a State claims an interest, 
if the State would not have been immune had the proceedings been 
brought against it or, in a case within paragraph (b) above, if the claim 
is neither admitted nor supported by prima facie evidence. 
133. It should be further noted that a corresponding 
provision is also included in section 8 of Singapore's 
State Immunity Act, 1979, ••• in section 7 of Pakistan's 
'" See footnote 66 above. 
.., See footnote 6S above. 
'" See footnote 68 above. Section 8 is a verbatim reproduction of 
section 6 of the United Kingdom model. 
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State Immunity Ordinance, 1981,149 in section 7 of the 
Foreign States Immunities Act, 1981 of South Africa, 150 
and in section 8 of Canada's State Immunity Act 
of 1982},1 
(c) International conventions 
(i) 1972 European Convention on State Immunity 
134. The 1972 European Convention on State Im-
munity152 contains two relevant provisions: 
Article 9 
A Contracting State cannot claim immunity from the jurisdiction of 
a court of another Contracting State if the proceedings relate to: 
(a) its rights or interests in, or its use or possession of, immovable 
property; or 
(b) its obligations arising out of its rights or interests in, or use or 
possession of, immovable property 
and the property is situated in the territory of the State of the forum. 
Article 10 
A Contracting State cannot claim immunity from the jurisdiction of 
a court of another Contracting State if the proceedings relate to a right 
in movable or immovable property arising by way of succession, gift 
or bona vacantia. 
135. Article 9 provides for non-immunity in pro-
ceedings concerning the rights and obligations of a State 
in, or in connection with, immovable property situated 
in the territory of the forum State. "Possession" is not 
always regarded as a right in the sense attributed to that 
term in certain legal systems. The expressions "right", 
"use" and "possession" should be interpreted broadly. 
This article covers proceedings concerning the rights of 
a foreign State in immovable property in the forum 
State, including mortgages, nuisance, trespass or other 
unauthorized use, lease or tenancy agreements, posses-
sion or eviction, rents or payments for use of the 
property and liabilities of the occupier of immovable 
property. Article 10 provides for non-immunity in 
proceedings relating to a right arising by way of succes-
sion, gift or bona vacantia, which in some legal systems 
is considered as a right of succession, and in others as a 
right of forfeiture of goods without ownership. 
(ii) Inter-American Draft Convention on Jurisdictional 
Immunity of States 
136. The recent Inter-American Draft Convention on 
Jurisdictional Immunity of States (1983)153 contains a 
brief provision on this exception: 
'" See footnote 69 above. Section 7 of the Pakistan Ordinance is 
entitled "Ownership, possession and use of property". 
IS. See footnote 70 above. Subsection (2) of section 7 exempts from 
the jurisdiction of South African courts proceedings relating to a 
foreign State's title to, or its use or possession of, property used for a 
diplomatic mission or a consular post. 
." See footnote 67 above. Section 8 is confined to proceedings 
relating to a State's interest in property arising by way of succession, 
gift or bona vacantia. 
'"~ See footnote 39 above . 
• " See footnote 77 above. 
Article 6 
States shal1 not claim immunity from jurisdiction ... : 
(b) In proceedi~gs for the distribution of assets, be they of a civil, 
trade or commercial nature; 
(c) In actions involving real property located in the State of the 
forum with the exceptions contained in international treaties or in 
diplomatic or consular practices; 
137. Paragraph (c) also bases the assumption of 
jurisdiction on the location or geographical situation of 
the immovable property, subject to the limitations con-
tained in bilateral or multilateral agreements, or in 
diplomatic or consular practice. It does not include 
movable property. Paragraph (b) deals with another 
type of proceedings, namely distribution of assets of a 
civil, trade or commercial nature. 
3. INTERNATIONAL OPINION 
138. In this particular field of proceedings relating to 
rights to property, especially immovable property, 
situated in the State of the forum, opinions of writers 
are practically uniform in favour of the assumption and 
exercise of jurisdiction by the competent judicial 
authority of the forum State. This relatively clear trend 
of legal opinions has reflected the less controversial 
practice of States in upholding jurisdiction and rejection 
of immunity in the interest of administration of justice. 
The opinions of lawyers may be gathered from interna-
tional meetings such as that of the Institute of Interna-
tional Law in 1952,154 and more recently that of the 
International Law Association in 1982. 
139. The draft articles for a convention on State im-
munity adopted by the International Law Association 
in 1982155 contain the following provision: 
Article /11. Exceptions to immunity from adjudication 
A foreign State shal1 not be immune from the jurisdiction of the 
forum State to adjudicate in the fol1owing instances inter alia: 
D. Where the cause of action relates to: 
1. The foreign State's rights or interests in, or its possession or 
use of, immovable property in the forum State; or 
2. Obligations of the foreign State arising out of its rights or 
interests in, or its possession or use of, immovable property 
in the forum State; or 
3. Rights or interests of the foreign State in movable or im-
movable property in the forum State arising by way of suc-
cession, gift or bona vacantia. 
4. AN ESTABLISHED EXCEPTION 
140. In a far less controversial area such as that of 
"ownership, possession and use of property" by States, 
IS' See, for example, the views expressed by members of the In-
stitute on the report and final draft resolutions presented by 
E. Lemonon on "L'immunite de jurisdiction et d'exetution forcee des 
Etats etrangers" (Annuaire de I'/nstilul de droit international, 19$2 
(Basel), vol. 44, part I, pp. Set seq.). See also P. Jessup, rapporteur 
for the Harvard Law School draft on "Competence of Courts in 
regard to Foreign States", op. cit. (footnote 137 above). 
"' See footnote 81 above. 
51 Documents of the lhlrly-nrth session 
currently under examination, it is possible to conclude, 
after having analysed the judicial, governmental and 
legislative practice of States, that there is an established 
general exception to State immunity. International legal 
opinion lends credence to such a proposition. The 
problem is not to overcome a political or psychological 
barrier, but rather to define, delimit and possibly de-
marcate the scope of the application of this general 
exception and its ramifications. Further analysis may be 
needed in an endeavour to formulate an appropriate 
provision for this draft article. 
C. Formulation of draft article 15 
141. The contents of this draft article should cover im-
movable as well as movable property of a State or in 
which a State has or claims an interest. It should also 
cover the use of property in the possession or control of 
a foreign State. Proceedings may relate to rights as well 
as obligations of the foreign State in regard to property 
situated in the State of the forum. They may also relate 
to rights and interests of a foreign State arising within 
the State of the forum by way of succession, gift or 
bona vacantia. The provision should also deal with the 
possibility of a foreign State asserting ownership or any 
other claims of interest in a property in issue 156 and with 
the borderline between the various cases in which the 
court rejects or recognizes such claims of interest, and in 
which it could thereby deny or uphold immunity and 
decline to exercise further jurisdiction after having ex-
". See, for example, the "gold bars" case (1952) (see footnote 131 
above); Hong Kong Aircraft: Civil Air Transport Inc. v. Central Air 
Transport Corp. (1953) (United Kingdom, The Law Reports, House 
of Lords, 1953, p. 70), cf. the judgment in first instance by Sir Leslie 
Gibson (1950) (International Law Reports, 1950 (London). vol. 17 
(1956), p. 173. case No. 45); and Juan Ysmael & Co. v. Government 
of the Republic of Indonesia (1954) (The Law Reports, House of 
Lords, 1955. p. 72). 
amined or established prima facie evidence of title or 
proof of posse.ssion or effective control of property in 
issue or the use of which is in dispute. There are also 
reasons for excluding from this exception the special 
status of diplomatic and consular premises. 
142. Article IS might read as follows: 
Article 15. Ownership, possession 
. and use 0/ property 
1. Unless otherwise agreed, a State is not immune 
from the jurisdiction of the courts of another State in 
respect of proceedings relating to: 
(a) any right or interest of the State in, or its posses-
sion or use of, or any obligation of the State arising out 
of its interest in, or its possession or use of, any im-
movable property situated in the State of the forum; or 
(b) any right or interest of the State in any im-
movable or movable property in the State of the forum, 
arising by way of succession, gift or bona vacantia; or 
(c) the distribution of assets in connection with the 
estates of deceased persons or persons of unsound mind 
or insolvency, the winding up of companies or the ad-
ministration of trusts, in which a State has or claims a 
right or interest in any property; or 
(d) any property in the possession or control of a 
State or in which a State claims a right or interest, if the 
claim is neither admitted nor supported by prima facie 
evidence, and the proceedings have been brought 
against a person other than a State, if the State itself 
would not have been immune had the proceedings been 
brought against it. 
1. Paragraph 1 is without prejudice to the im-
munities of States in respect of their property from at-
tachment and execution, or the inviolability of premises 
of diplomatic or special missions or consular premises. 
